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The issue of corporate residence has recently attracted a great deal of attention in 
both the popular press and in academic discourse, primarily because of the phenomenon of 
corporate inversions. The consensus among commentators is that the root of the problem is a 
flawed definition of corporate residence, and they have therefore proposed replacing the 
current definition, which relies upon place of incorporation, with another that relies upon 
control and management, home office, customer base, source of income, or the residence of 
shareholders. 
The thesis of this article is that the concept of tax residence is inapplicable to 
corporations. Residence in tax law delineates the boundaries of distributive justice, and 
whereas corporations cannot be parties to a scheme of distributive justice, corporate 
residence is a misnomer. The incongruity of corporate residence along with the fact that 
residence is a fundamental concept in international taxation is one reason that the current 
international tax regime has proven unviable. 
The article then goes on to describe in broad outline an international corporate tax 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
Although straddling the cusp between two of the more esoteric subfields of tax 
law—corporate taxation and international taxation—the phenomenon of corporate 
inversions has caught the attention of the public and the popular press.1  Journalists, 
politicians, government officials, and scholars point out that a little paperwork can 
convert a domestic corporation (which pays tax on its worldwide income) into a foreign 
corporation (which pays tax only on its U.S.-source income).2 They go on to argue that 
the exploitation of this loophole by multinational corporations is unfair to ordinary 
citizens.3 Charges of immorality, or worse, are frequent.4 Responding to such concerns, 
                                                      
1 An inversion is a sophisticated maneuver enabling a U.S. corporation to expatriate. Technically, a 
domestic corporation cannot become a foreign corporation. Because U.S. tax law classifies corporations as 
domestic or foreign according to the jurisdiction that imbued them with legal personhood (a corporation 
created under the laws of the United States or any State is domestic, while a corporation created under the 
laws of a foreign jurisdiction is foreign), a domestic corporation will forever remain domestic. I.R.C. § 
7701(a)(4) (defining “domestic”) and § 7701(a)(5) (defining “foreign”). For a brief history of these 
definitions, see David R. Tillinghast, A Matter of Definitions: “Foreign” and “Domestic” Taxpayers, 2 INT’L 
TAX & BUS. LAW. 239, 252–53 (1984). Granted, a domestic corporation or its shareholders can establish a 
new corporation under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction, but the foreign corporation will have its own legal 
personality and will be a subsidiary or a sibling (or some other relative) of the old domestic corporation. The 
domestic corporation will not have become the foreign corporation. See, e.g., Tillinghast, id. at 259 (“[A] 
mid-life shift in a corporation's status may be achieved only at the price of ‘killing’ the old corporation and 
‘creating’ a new one …”). To circumvent this obstacle to expatriation, tax planners developed a series of 
techniques collectively known as inversions. See, e.g., Donald J. Marples & Jane G. Gravelle, Corporate 
Expatriation, Inversions, and Mergers: Tax Issues, CONG. RES. SERV. 4–5 (2017), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43568.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SPK-CVTN].  In a typical inversion, the 
subsidiary of a foreign corporation merges into a U.S. corporation that had served as the parent of a 
multinational group. See, e.g., Steven Goldman, Corporate Expatriation: A Case Analysis, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 
71, 73–75, 84–91 (2008). Simultaneously, assets that produce foreign-source income are transferred from the 
U.S. corporation to the foreign corporation. See, e.g., Goldman, id. at 77–80, 92–98. When the smoke clears, 
the corporate structure may be very similar to what it was previously, except that at the peak of the corporate 
pyramid now stands a foreign corporation instead of a domestic corporation. See, e.g., Omri Marian, 
Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1654–55 (2013). 
2 Joseph A. Tootle, The Regulation of Corporate Inversions and “Substantial Business Activities,” 
33 VA. TAX REV. 353, 354 (2013) (“Corporate inversions are transactions in which a U.S.-based company 
changes its place of incorporation from the United States to a foreign jurisdiction, often without an 
accompanying change in its business operations.”); Adam H. Rosenzweig, Source as a Solution to Residence, 
17 FLA. TAX REV. 471, 497 (2015) (“[Inversions involve] a significant change in tax consequences for what 
was, in effect, a relatively small formal legal change with virtually no change in business model, ownership, 
management, or internal structure. This is precisely what concerned policymakers about inversions.”); 
Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, 
Outdates Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 321 (2001) (reporting that the Chief of 
Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation and the Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy had expressed 
concern “about the legal loophole that allowed property and casualty insurers to stop paying income tax 
simply by moving the parent corporation to Bermuda.”); Jeffrey Zients & Seth Hanlon, The Corporate 
Inversions Tax Loophole: What You Need to Know, THE WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 8, 2016, 6:39 PM), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/04/08/corporate-inversions-tax-loophole-what-you-need-
know [https://perma.cc/RK7G-WQGP] (“Corporate inversions are a tax loophole that allow U.S. companies 
to avoid paying U.S. taxes by relocating—on paper—to a foreign country”); Paul Krugman, Corporate Artful 
Dodgers, N.Y.TIMES, July 24, 2014, at A17 (“The most important thing to understand about inversion is that 
it does not in any meaningful sense involve American business moving overseas … It [is] a purely paper 
transaction.”). 
3 THE WHITE HOUSE, You Don’t Get to Pick Your Tax Rate. Neither Should Corporations (Sept. 26, 
2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/share/the-facts-on-inversions [https://perma.cc/G5F8-3SVP] 
(“When large corporations invert overseas to reduce the taxes they paid in the United States, working 
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Congress in 2004 amended the Internal Revenue Code and made it more difficult for 
domestic corporations to expatriate. I.R.C. § 7874 now provides that, in certain cases, the 
post-inversion successor to a domestic corporation will be classified as a domestic 
corporation, even if it was organized under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction. In 2016, the 
Treasury issued temporary regulations that further limit the opportunity of obtaining tax 
advantages by inverting.5 
The often emotionally charged rhetoric tends to ignore the foundational question 
of why the post-inversion, foreign-registered corporation should be subject to U.S. 
worldwide taxation. The argument seems to be that a U.S. corporation should not be able 
to shed its U.S. residence by the mere shuffling of papers.6 However, this argument 
succeeds merely in raising the question of why the pre-inversion company was subject to 
tax on its worldwide income in the first place. If place of incorporation (POI) is the 
proper determinant of residence,7 then reincorporation abroad severs the relevant tie and 
the post-inversion company is appropriately classified as a foreign resident. On the other 
hand, if POI is a not a proper determinant of residence, then the fact that the pre-inversion 
company was incorporated in the United States is irrelevant in establishing the residence 
either of it or of the post-inversion company.8 
Rarely mentioned in the discourse is that founders have free rein to organize their 
corporation in any jurisdiction they choose and that a corporation registered in a foreign 
jurisdiction is, from its inception, exempt from U.S. tax on its foreign-source income.9 An 
inversion merely equalizes the future tax treatment of corporations originally organized 
                                                                                                                                                   
Americans ultimately have to pay more to help fund the services we all rely on.”); Andrew Soergel, Ask an 
Economist: What the Heck is a Corporate Inversion?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 16, 2016, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2016-02-16/ask-an-economist-what-the-heck-is-a-corporate-
inversion [https://perma.cc/TMY4-KP2J] (“All of that revenue drain, who's going to pay for that? Either 
you’re going to have to increase the budget deficit or tax all the taxpayers.”). 
4 Allan Sloan, Positively Un-American, FORTUNE (July 7, 2014), 
http://fortune.com/2014/07/07/taxes-offshore-dodge [https://perma.cc/L98C-HVT5] (describing inversions as 
“disgusting”); Jennifer Karr, Immoral Legislation and Tax Benefits for Expat Corporations, 48 CONN. L. 
REV. 1703, 1706 (2016) (“Frequent criticisms of corporate inversions tend to involve assessing the morality 
(or lack thereof) of corporations engaging in the practice.”); Hale E. Sheppard, Fight or Flight of U.S.-Based 
Multinational Businesses: Analyzing the Causes for, Effects of, and Solutions to the Corporate Inversion 
Trend, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 551, 558 (2003) (“[C]ritics of inversions have questioned the morality, 
patriotism and scruples of corporate directors.”). 
5 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7874–8T. But see Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Internal Revenue 
Serv., No. 16–944 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2017) (invalidating regulations on procedural grounds). 
6 See the sources cited supra note 2. 
7 See supra, note 1. 
8 See Michael S. Kirsch, The Congressional Response to Corporate Expatriations: The Tension 
Between Symbols and Substance in the Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 24 VA. TAX REV. 475, 502, 
549 (2005) (describing inversions as a “red herring” and asking, “If … a change in the corporate parent's 
place of incorporation is mere “paperwork” involving a new “sheet of paper,” the logical question is why 
does the U.S. tax code generally rely on a corporation's place of incorporation as the touchstone for defining 
residence?”). A similar line of reasoning applies to expatriation under other tests of corporate residence. See, 
e.g., Marian, supra note 1, at 1647 (“If one is … concerned about management expatriation, it might be 
because the real reason for taxing corporation [sic] is not to regulate managers, but some other reason.” 
(emphasis in the original)). 
9 I.R.C. § 882(b) (providing that “[i]n the case of a foreign corporation … gross income includes 
only—(1) gross income which is derived from sources within the United States … and (2) gross income 
which is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States.”). In this 
Article, the term “U.S.-source income” will include both income derived from U.S. sources and income that 
is effectively connected to a U.S. trade or business. 
2017] THE MYTH OF CORPORATE TAX RESIDENCE 9 
in the United States with that of corporations originally registered abroad. Notably, 
neither the amended Code nor the regulations place any restrictions on where a 
corporation is originally registered.10 In other words, despite the fact that POI was and 
remains completely discretionary, a U.S.-registered corporation that attempts to 
expatriate faces both moral outrage and strict anti-avoidance provisions, while a 
corporation whose founders had the foresight to organize under the laws of a foreign 
jurisdiction can quietly continue to enjoy the privileged status of a foreign corporation.11 
In many instances, registration in the United States is no more than a foot fault, but with 
far-reaching consequences.12 
Another major issue in international taxation, one that has attracted considerably 
less attention but is much more significant in practice, is the phenomenon of U.S. 
corporations operating abroad via subsidiaries registered in a foreign jurisdiction. In 
theory, U.S. corporations are subject to tax on their worldwide income.13 In practice, 
foreign-source income is not subject to U.S. tax until the U.S. parent receives a dividend 
from, or sells its shares in, the foreign subsidiary. Because the U.S. parent can defer 
payment of tax indefinitely, the effective rate of tax on its foreign-source income is close 
to zero.14 Lamenting the fact that corporations are effectively subject to tax only on their 
U.S.-source income, some commentators have called upon Congress to tighten up the 
rules of international corporate taxation and to require U.S. multinationals to pay tax on 
their worldwide income, including income earned via foreign subsidiaries.15 From the 
opposite end of the political spectrum, others have argued that the U.S. corporate tax is 
uncompetitive and have urged the adoption of a formal territorial tax structure. 16 
                                                      
10 See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 2, at 322. 
11 See, e.g., William B. Barker, International Tax Reform Should Begin at Home: Replace the 
Corporate Income Tax with a Territorial Expenditure Tax, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 647, 665 (2010) (“For 
new corporations, there is considerable choice in choosing residence. For existing corporations, though tax is 
a strong incentive to change residence, changing residence is difficult without adverse tax and political 
consequences.”); PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH: 
PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM 135 (2005) [hereinafter  PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL]; Eric 
Toder, International Competitiveness: Who Competes Against Whom and for What?, 65 TAX L. REV. 505, 
513–14 (2012) (“There are substantial barriers preventing existing corporations from changing their corporate 
residence. But the start-ups that will become the corporate giants of the future have a choice of where to 
establish residence.”). 
12 Professor Shaviro notes that “[t]ax lawyers who permit U.S. incorporation may be guilty of 
malpractice.” Daniel Shaviro, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: The Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S. Corporate 
Residence, 64 TAX L. REV. 377, 378 (2011). 
13 I.R.C. § 61(a) (defining gross income as “all income from whatever source derived”), § 63(a) 
(defining taxable income as gross income minus certain deductions), § 11(a) (imposing tax “on the taxable 
income of every corporation”). 
14 The formula for computing the present value of a future liability is y=x/(1+r)n, where y is the 
present value, x is the nominal amount of the liability, r is the relevant rate of interest, and n is the number of 
years until the actual payment. As the value of n increases, the value of y decreases. In other words, the 
longer the taxpayer succeeds in deferring the payment of tax, the less the present value of the payment. 
15 Edward D. Kleinbard et al., 24 International Tax Experts Address Current Tax Reform Efforts in 
Congress (2015), available at https://americansfortaxfairness.org/files/24-International-Tax-Experts-Letter-
to-Congress-9-25-15-FINAL-for-printing.pdf [https://perma.cc/KLQ6-H6HW]. 
16 See, e.g., Michael S. Knoll, Taxation, Competitiveness, and Inversions: A Response to Kleinbard, 
155 TAX NOTES 619 (May 1, 2017); PAUL RYAN & KEVIN BRADY, A BETTER WAY: OUR VISION FOR A 
CONFIDENT AMERICA 10 (2016), available at https://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-Tax-
PolicyPaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7X2-6U4C] (Report of the GOP Tax Reform Tax Force, appointed by 
Speaker Paul Ryan and chaired by Rep. Kevin Brady) (“Our high corporate rate, our outdated worldwide tax 
system, and our origin-basis system that taxes exports have created a perfect storm that has encouraged so 
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Proposals for a tax holiday that would permit U.S. multinationals to repatriate, at a 
reduced rate of tax, earnings currently held by foreign subsidiaries have been vigorously 
debated.17 
Here, too, behind the rhetoric lies the paradox of corporate tax residence. On the 
one hand, if place of incorporation properly determines residence, then the subsidiary is 
not a U.S. resident and its income is properly not reportable until received by the U.S. 
parent. On the other hand, if place of incorporation is not determinative, then the fact that 
the corporation sitting at the apex of the corporate hierarchy was incorporated in the 
United States should not expose to U.S. tax either its or its subsidiaries’ foreign-source 
income. 
Responding to these challenges, numerous commentators have argued that the 
problem lies with the current flawed definition of corporate residence. Consequently, 
they have proposed alternative tests that look to factors other than POI, such as central 
management and control,18 home office,19 customer base,20 primary source of income,21 
the stock exchange listing the corporation’s shares,22 or the residence of a majority of its 
shareholders.23 The criteria by which commentators evaluate the appropriateness of the 
different test are also many and varied.24 Against the background of corporate inversions, 
                                                                                                                                                   
many businesses to move their headquarters overseas. That is why the pace of so-called inversions … has 
accelerated dramatically in recent years.”). 
17 Ciara Linnane, Trump’s Tax Holiday Won’t Make Much of a Difference Without Corporate-Tax 
Reform, MARKET WATCH (Dec. 10, 2016), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/trumps-tax-holiday-wont-
make-much-of-a-difference-without-corporate-tax-reform-2016-12-08 [https://perma.cc/5BJD-WSYR]; 
Kevin Drawbaugh, U.S. Senators Propose Tax Holiday for Foreign Profits, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2015), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tax-repatriation-idUSKBN0L32CP20150130 [https://perma.cc/P8NZ-
B46F]. In 2004, Congress granted a tax holiday that permitted U.S. multinationals to repatriate profits at a 
5.25% tax rate. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–357, § 965, 118 Stat. 1514, 1518 
(2004). 
18 Marian, supra note 1, at 1664; Kyrie E. Thorpe, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce: 
Is the Internet Age Rendering the Concept of Permanent Establishment Obsolete?, 11 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
633, 693 (1997); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Beyond Territoriality and Deferral: The Promise of “Managed and 
Controlled” (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 248, 2011), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1908707 [https://perma.cc/5XJ9-6N23] [hereinafter 
Avi-Yonah, Beyond Territoriality]; Henry Ordower, Utopian Visions Toward a Grand Unified Global 
Income Tax, 14 Fla. Tax Rev. 361, 404–05 (2013); Terrence R. Chorvat, Book Review: “A Different 
Perspective on Tax Competition”, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 501, 515 (2003); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax 
Advice for the Second Obama Administration: Corporate and International Tax Reform: Proposals for the 
Second Obama Administration (and Beyond), 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1365, 1370 (2013). 
19 Marian, supra note 1, at 1645; Avi-Yonah, Beyond Territoriality, supra note 18; PRESIDENT'S 
ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 11, at 135; Tillinghast, supra note 1, at 262; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 507, 528 (1997). 
20 George K. Yin, Letter to the Editor, Stopping Corporate Inversions Sensibly and Legally, 144 
TAX NOTES 1087 (2004). 
21 Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 507. 
22 Marian, supra note 1, at 1664; Rebecca Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat 
Tax World?, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 1099 (1988–89); John T. VanDenburgh, Closing International 
Loopholes, Changing the Corporation Tax Base to Effectively Combat Tax Avoidance, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 
313, 347–54 (2012). 
23 J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Defending Worldwide Taxation With 
a Shareholder-Based Definition of Corporate Residence, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1681 (2017); Robert A. Green, 
The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18, 
70–74 (1993); Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 TAX L. REV. 99, 160 (2011). 
24 See generally David Elkins, The Elusive Definition of Corporate Tax Residence, 62 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. (forthcoming 2018). 
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many ask which test of corporate residence is the least manipulable.25 Others prefer tests 
that are clear and predictable. 26  Some attempt to correlate residence with benefit. 27 
Several scholars have recently suggested looking to the purpose of corporate taxation in 
order to ascertain the most appropriate definition of corporate residence.28 
However, the literature has hitherto failed to address what I believe to be the 
fundamental questions that must underlie any discussion of corporate tax residence. First, 
why is residence a relevant attribute when determining tax liability? Second, is the 
concept of tax residence applicable to the corporate entity? Instead, the tacit assumption 
underlying the discourse is that the concept of residence is in principle applicable to 
corporations and that it is the task of commentators and policy makers to formulate an 
appropriate test by which to determine the residence of corporations.29 
The thesis of this article is that such an assumption is unwarranted and that tax 
residence is an attribute of individuals only, inapplicable to the corporate entity. Already 
at the outset, it is important to stress that the argument is not semantic. I will not rest my 
claim on the fact that, as nonphysical entities, corporations cannot “reside” in a place in 
the same sense that natural persons can. Rather, I will argue that the distinction between 
residents and nonresidents derives from the need to delineate the universe within which 
                                                      
25 Fleming et al., supra note 23, at 1687–89, 1691, 1710; Marian, supra note 1, at 1643, 1653; 
Shaviro, supra note 12, at 381–85 (distinguishing between formal and substantive electivity); Rosenzweig, 
supra note 2, at 495; Michael J. McIntyre, Determining the Residence of Members of a Corporate Group, 51 
CAN. TAX J. 1567, 1571 (2003); Aldo Forgione, Clicks and Mortar: Taxing Multinational Business Profits in 
the Digital Age, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 719, 725–26 (2003); Daniel Shaviro, Why Worldwide Welfare as a 
Normative Standard in U.S. Tax Policy?, 60 TAX L. REV. 155, 172 (2007); Ilan Benshalom, The Quest to Tax 
Financial Income in a Global Economy: Emerging to an Allocation Phase, 28 VA. TAX REV. 165, 216–17 
(2008); Tootle, supra note 2, at 354; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal 
Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1595–96 (2000) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, 
Globalization]; John A. Swain, Same Questions, Different Answers: A Comparative Look at International 
and State and Local Taxation, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 111, 117 (2008); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. 
Clausing & Michael C. Durst, Allocating Business Profits For Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt A 
Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 497, 499 (2009) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah et al., Allocating]; Stephen 
E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Designing a 21st Century Corporate Tax – An Advance 
U.S. Minimum Tax on Foreign Income and Other Measures to Protect the Base, 17 FLA. TAX REV. 669, 718 
(2015); Susan C. Morse, Startup Ltd.: Tax Planning and Initial Incorporation Location, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 
319 (2013); DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 70–71 (2014) [hereinafter SHAVIRO, 
FIXING]; Avi-Yonah, supra note 19, at 528. 
26 Tillinghast, supra note 1, at 258–66; Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 489; Julie Roin, Can the 
Income Tax Be Saved? The Promise and Pitfalls of Adopting Worldwide Formulary Apportionment, 61 TAX 
L. REV. 169, 189 (2008); Kirsch, supra note 8, at 568; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, For Haven's Sake: Reflections 
on Inversion Transactions, 95 TAX NOTES 1793, 1797 (June 17, 2002). 
27 Rudnick, supra note 22, at 994; Marian, supra note 1, at 1615, 1642 (describing this view); 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 
1193, 1205–06 (2004); Kirsch, supra note 8, at 551–67; Andrew Mun, Reinterpreting Corporate Inversions: 
Non-Tax Competitions and Frictions, 126 YALE L.J. 2152 (2017) (solution to problem of corporate 
inversions is to align tax paid with benefits). Cf. J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, 
Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 
299, 315 (2001); Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, The David R. Tillinghast 
Lecture: ‘What’s Source Got to Do With It?’ Source Rules and U.S. International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 
81, 104–05 (2002). 
28 Fleming et al., supra note 23; Marian, supra note 1; McIntyre, supra note 25, at 1570. 
29 On rare occasion, the assumption is explicit. See, e.g., Tillinghast, supra note 1, at 239–40; 
Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 475 (“[T]his Article assumes that the United States has an income tax that turns, 
in part, on the residency of corporations …”). 
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certain norms of distributive justice operate and that, as the nature of the corporate entity 
precludes its membership in any scheme of distributive justice, the categories of 
“resident” and “nonresident” are inapplicable to it. 
Part II will explore why residence is a relevant attribute when determining the tax 
liability of individuals. It will explain that income tax is an application of the principle 
that tax liability should accord with ability-to-pay and that, in turn, ability-to-pay derives 
from a certain set of conceptions regarding distributive justice. Under these conceptions, 
distributive justice is not universal in scope, but applies only to those with a significant 
personal connection to a given society. Residents are those who are subject to taxation in 
accordance with their ability to pay. For nonresidents, the guiding principle in 
determining tax liability is not distributive justice but rather commutative justice. 
Part III will examine whether the concept of residence is applicable to 
corporations. It will argue that as corporations have no personal identity, experience 
neither pleasure nor pain, have no personal attachments, and are not Kantian rational 
beings, they cannot be members of a collective to which the terms of distributive justice 
apply. 
Part IV distinguishes between corporations and their shareholders. Although 
corporations cannot be residents of a country, individual shareholders can, and as 
computing their ability-to-pay requires taking into account their accession to wealth 
derived from shareholding, a means must be found whereby to tax them on that income. 
In the domestic arena, the corporate income tax serves this function. However, with 
regard to any corporation with both U.S. and foreign shareholders, the imposition of tax 
on the corporate entity as a proxy for taxing individual shareholders is not feasible. 
Consequently, the current corporate tax regime is unviable in the international arena.  
Part V describes in broad outline an alternative international corporate tax regime 
that would attempt to reach the worldwide income of resident shareholders and the U.S.-
source income of nonresident shareholders. 
Part VI summarizes the findings and offers some concluding thoughts. 
 
II. INDIVIDUAL RESIDENCE 
 
A. Introduction  
In order to examine whether the concept of residence is applicable to 
corporations, we first need to understand why a person’s residence is relevant when 
determining tax liability. This Part will explore residence in the context of individual 
taxpayers. Part III will then turn to corporate residence.           
 
B. Ability-to-Pay 
The role played by residence in international taxation is a function of the 
normative underpinnings of home-country income taxation.30  Contemporary literature 
                                                      
30 Home country taxation is the tax imposed by a country on its own residents. Host country 
taxation is the tax imposed by a country on foreign residents who engage in economic activity, including 
passive investment, within its territory. In other words, if we focus on income tax, an individual may be 
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justifies the income tax by reference to the principle of ability-to-pay. 31  This term 
expresses the idea that those who are better off should contribute more to the provision of 
services for the general welfare than do those who are less well off. Why they should do 
so is a question to which supporters of ability-to-pay taxation offer various answers.32 
Some refer to Utilitarian doctrine.33 Because of the decreasing marginal utility of money, 
taking a dollar from a wealthy individual causes less disutility than does taking a dollar 
from a poor individual; and taking a dollar from a wealthy individual and using it to 
                                                                                                                                                   
subject to a country's income tax regime either by virtue of the fact that the individual resides in the country 
or by virtue of the fact that the individual derives income from sources located within that country. 
31 See, e.g., PROFESSORS BRUINS, EINAUDI, SELIGMAN & SIR JOSIAH STAMP, REPORT ON DOUBLE 
TAXATION SUBMITTED TO THE FINANCIAL COMMITTEE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1923), reprinted in 4 
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES TAX CONVENTIONS 4022 (1962) 
[hereinafter LEAGUE OF NATIONS REPORT ON DOUBLE TAXATION] (“[T]he entire exchange theory has been 
supplanted in modern times by the faculty theory or theory of ability to pay.”); Shay et al., supra note 27, at 
94 (“[T]he principal normative justification for income taxation is that it allocates the cost of government 
among taxpayers on the basis of comparative economic well-being, or ability to pay.”); Kyle C. Logue & 
Gustavo G. Vetton, Narrowing the Tax Gap Through Presumptive Taxation, 2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 100, 112–
13, 121 (2010); Donna M. Byre, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 739, 765 (1995); Eric 
Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of “Incomes,” 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 
1091 (2001) (“From the beginning, supporters of the modern income tax stressed that it was necessary to tie 
taxation to ability to pay …”); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Choosing a Tax Rate Structure in the Face of 
Disagreement, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1697, 1708−17 (2005); Shaviro, supra note 12, at 388−89. 
Before the mid-nineteenth century, benefit theory dominated the tax policy discourse. See, e.g., 
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 238 (Richard Tuck ed., 1996) (Taxes should be imposed in accordance with 
“the benefit that every one receiveth thereby …”); ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF AND 
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 310 (1776); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 160 (1789) (“To defend the community against its external as well as its internal adversaries, 
are tasks, not to mention others of a less indispensable nature, which cannot be fulfilled but at a considerable 
expense. But whence is the money for defraying to costs to come? It can be obtained in no other manner than 
by contributions to be collected from individuals; in a word, by taxes. The produce then of these taxes is to be 
looked upon as a kind of benefit which it is necessary the governing part of the community should receive for 
the use of the whole.” (emphasis in the original)); LEAGUE OF NATIONS REPORT ON DOUBLE TAXATION, supra 
note 31, at 4022 (“The older theory of taxation was the exchange theory, which was related directly to the 
philosophical basis of society in the ‘social contract,’ according to which the reason and measure of taxation 
are in accordance with the principles of an exchange as between the government and the individual … The 
benefit theory was that taxes ought to be paid in accordance with the particular benefits conferred upon the 
individual.”). One of the first to challenge the then-conventional view was JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 398 (1848) [hereinafter MILL, PRINCIPLES] (“If there were any justice, therefore, in the 
theory of justice now under consideration, those who are least able of helping or defending themselves, being 
those to whom the protection of the government is the most indispensable, ought to pay the greatest share of 
its price …”); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 54–55 (1863) 
(“[I]f there were no law or government the rich would be far better able to protect themselves than the poor 
would be, and indeed would probably succeed in making the poor their slaves … From these confusions there 
is no other mode of extrication other than the utilitarian.”). By the mid-twentieth century, benefit theory as a 
basis for broad-based taxes, such as the income tax, had been relegated to merely historical interest. HENRY 
C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 3 (1938) (“[I]t is fair to say … that this principle, with reference to 
the allocation of the whole tax burden, is now of interest only for the history of the doctrine … [and] has been 
repudiated as completely by students as by legislatures.”). 
32 The classic text examining this issue is WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY J. KALVEN, UNEASY CASE FOR 
PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1953). 
33 See, in particular, the works of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, supra, note 31. For a 
review of Jeremy Bentham’s writings and their applicability to tax theory, see Sagit Leviner, The Normative 
Underpinnings of Taxation, 13 NEV. L.J. 95, 113–21 (2012). 
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provide public services or to assist the needy increases the total quantum of happiness.34 
Some rely on Rawlsian principles. According to Rawls, everyone has an equal moral 
claim to material resources and other primary goods.35 Justice permits deviation from an 
equal distribution of wealth only to the extent that such inequality works to the benefit of 
the least well-off stratum of society.36 If the market distribution is more unequal than that 
—as is likely the case—then justice requires a redistribution of resources.37 Some refer to 
sacrifice theory, according to which each person should experience the same degree of 
pain from paying taxes: because of the declining marginal utility of money, a wealthy 
individual would need to pay more than a poor person in order to experience the same 
degree of disutility.38 Others seem to rely on an innate sense of fairness not necessarily 
grounded in a rigorous theory of social philosophy.39 That individuals who can afford to 
                                                      
34 See, e.g., HENRY SIDGWICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 519 (1887) (“The common 
sense of mankind, in considering these inequalities, implicitly adopts, as I conceive, two propositions laid 
down by Bentham as to the relation of wealth to happiness: viz. (1) that an increase of wealth is—speaking 
broadly and generally—productive of an increase of happiness to its possessor; and (2) that the resulting 
increase in happiness is not simply proportional to the increase in wealth, but stands in a decreasing ratio to it 
… And from these two propositions taken together the obvious conclusion is that the more any society 
approximates to equality in the distribution of wealth among its members, the greater on the whole is the 
aggregate of satisfactions which the society in question derives from the wealth it possesses.”). 
See also Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Utilitarianism and Wealth Transfer Taxation, 69 ARK. L. REV. 695 
(2016); Calvin H. Johnson, Was It Lost? Personal Deductions Under Tax Reform, 59 SMU L. REV. 689, 693 
(2006); Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the Case for 
Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (1998). See also the sources cited in Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax 
Fairness or Unfairness? A Consideration of the Philosophical Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 
AM. J. TAX POL’Y 221, 236–42 (1995). 
35 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 103–04 (1971). 
36 Id. at 62, 75–78. 
37 Id. at 246–47 (justifying “steeply progressive income taxes” “given the injustice of existing 
institutions”). See also Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Unseating Privilege: Rawls, Equality of Opportunity, and 
Wealth Transfer Taxation, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 713, 713 (2013); Schoenblum, supra note 34, at 251–57 (1995) 
(discussing and criticizing the principles of taxation derivable from Rawls). 
38 Jay A. Soled, A Proposal to Lengthen the Tax Accounting Period, 14 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 35, 57 
(1997) (describing proportional sacrifice as “one of the fundamental tenets of a progressive tax structure”); 
Bruce Anderson, Strategic Choice Taxation: A Solution to the Federal Revenue Crisis, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 281, 297, n.48; McMahon & Abreu, supra note 34, at 32 (“The most persuasive arguments for the 
equity of progressive taxation rest on the concept … that taxation ought to exact equiproportional sacrifice”); 
Richard Winchester, Parity Lost: The Price of a Corporate Tax in a Progressive Tax World, 9 NEV. L.J. 130, 
131 (2008) (“[T]he income tax in the United States has always been intended to allocate the burden based on 
an individual’s ability to pay. This essentially embraces a theory of fairness referred to as the equal sacrifice 
theory.”) David Kamin, What is a Progressive Tax Change?: Unmasking Hidden Values in Distributional 
Debates, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 241, 272–79 (2008); Jeffrey H. Kahn, Personal Deductions – A Tax “Ideal” or 
Just Another “Deal”?, 2002 MICH. ST. U. – DETROIT COLL. L. REV. 1, 23 (“[E]qual sacrifice theory provides 
the most compelling argument for progressivity.”); Eric Rakowski, Symposium on Wealth Taxes Part I: Can 
Wealth Taxes Be Justified?, 53 TAX L. REV. 263, 310–16 (2000); Robert F. Parsley, Building a House of 
Cards: A Policy Evaluation of Tennessee’s Tax Reform Act of 2002 With Emphasis on Fairness to the Poor, 
70 TENN. L. REV. 1177, 1181–82 (2003); Kornhauser, supra note 31, at 1717–21; Sagit Leviner, From 
Deontology to Practical Application: The Vision of a Good Society and the Tax System, 26 VA. TAX REV. 
405, 427 (2006). 
39 Schoenblum, supra note 34, at 235 (“The ability to pay principle has now gained such 
widespread currency that its underlying premise rarely is questioned by tax law scholars. They tend to 
assume uncritically that there is a direct relation between ability to pay and fairness.”); Fleming et al., supra 
note 27, at 309 (describing the ability-to-pay doctrine as “dogma”). 
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do so should pay more than those who are struggling seems to strike an intuitive chord 
that is often sufficient to support a policy of taxation according to ability-to-pay.40 
For the purpose of our discussion, it is not important to identify the precise 
theoretical justification for taxation according to ability-to-pay or even to determine 
whether it has a precise theoretical justification. All that we need to note is that the 
subject matter of ability-to-pay taxation is the welfare of the various members of the 
collective, the conflicting claims to material resources held by various members of the 
collective, and the rights and obligations of those who are better off vis-à-vis those who 
are not as well off. Furthermore, in the context of tax policy, ability-to-pay is not an 
absolute or descriptive, but rather a relative and normative, term of art. It does not 
describe an individual’s absolute capacity to pay tax (a term which, when taken literally, 
refers to a person’s entire wealth or entire income); rather, it compares the relative effect 
of paying tax on the welfare of different individuals.41 
Granted, not all commentators accept the idea of taxation according to ability-to-
pay. Some argue that justice permits charging individuals no more than the market price 
of the services that they receive.42 More extreme versions hold that justice prohibits 
charging for services, even those that confer positive value, unless the recipient of those 
services explicitly contracted to pay for them.43 However, as income tax derives from the 
doctrine of ability-to-pay and as the question we are considering is whether residence is a 
concept applicable to corporations within the framework of income taxation, we do not 
need to consider these views here.   
 
C. Taxation of Worldwide Income 
The fact that income tax derives from the concept of ability-to-pay has an 
important ramification in the international arena. If the appropriate measure of ability-to-
pay is accession to wealth,44 then tax liability must be a function of worldwide income.45 
                                                      
40 See, e.g., Sergio Pareja, Taxation Without Liquidation: Rethinking “Ability to Pay,” 8 WIS. L. 
REV. 841, 843 (2008) (“Our tax system aims to tax people based on their ability to pay. As a society, we 
believe that it is fairer to make a billionaire pay more taxes than a homeless person.”); JOEL S. NEWMAN, A 
SHORT & HAPPY GUIDE TO FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 7 (2017) (“Quite a few of us can’t afford $6,250 per 
year … On the other hand, there are quite a few other folks in the US who can afford to pay a lot more than 
$6,250 per year. So what should we do? We should levy taxes based upon ability to pay.”). 
41 The text intentionally leaves the term “welfare” vague, as there are different opinions regarding 
the ultimate subject matter of distributive justice: pleasure, happiness, satisfaction of rational desire, access to 
resources necessary to realize one’s ends, and so forth. See generally RAWLS, supra note 35, at 25, 92–93; 
Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185 (1981); Ronald 
Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981). 
42 See, e.g., John R. McCulloch, For Proportional Taxation, in VIEWPOINTS ON PUBLIC FINANCE 22, 
25 (Harold M. Grooves ed., 1947) (“Providence has not been charged with injustice because the corn and 
other articles used indifferently by the poor and the rich cost one class as much as they cost the other. And 
such being the case, how can it be pretended that governments, in laying equal duties on these articles, 
commit injustice? A rich man will, of course, pay taxes and everything else, with less inconvenience than one 
who is poor. But is that any reason why he should be unfairly treated?”). 
43 See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 95 (1974) (“One cannot, whatever 
one’s purposes, just act so as to give people benefits and then demand (or seize) payment. Nor can a group of 
persons do this.”). 
44 This view is not universally held. There are those who argue that consumption and wealth are 
better measures of ability-to-pay than is income. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or 
Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974); David F. Bradford, The Case for a 
Personal Consumption Tax, in WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE? 75 (Joseph A. Pechman 
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For example, an individual with $100,000 in domestic income and $900,000 in foreign-
source income has—subject to proper accounting for any foreign income tax liability—
the same ability to pay tax as does an individual with $1,000,000 in domestic-source 
income.46 Imposing tax only on their domestic-source income would constitute a clear 
violation of the doctrine of ability-to-pay, manifested in this context of this example as a 
violation of horizontal equity.47 Furthermore, as the wealthy tend to have relatively more 
foreign-source earnings than those who are less well off, ignoring foreign-source income 
in calculating ability-to-pay would violate vertical equity, another principle derived from 
the principle of taxation in accordance with ability-to-pay.   
 
D. Delineating the Parameters of the Collective 
The concept of ability-to-pay is meaningless without delineating the parameters 
of the collective to which it refers. In other words, whose welfare, whose needs, whose 
claims, and whose resources are relevant? The collective to which the principles of 
distributive justice apply is a contentious issue in social philosophy. Social philosophers 
of the cosmopolitan school argue that the proper collective is humanity as a whole and 
that the rights and obligations of distributive justice transcend national boundaries.48 
Adopting such an approach would require taking into account the ability-to-pay and the 
needs of every person on the planet, imposing a worldwide tax, and providing worldwide 
benefits.49 Others disagree and limit the scope of distributive justice to the confines of a 
political society.50 Under this approach, it is the ability-to-pay and the needs of members 
                                                                                                                                                   
ed., 1980); David Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 499 (2000). 
However, we do not need to consider these views here. The purpose of this article is not to challenge income 
taxation but to challenge the concept of corporate taxation within the framework of income taxation. 
Consequently, I will accept arguendo the underlying assumptions of income taxation: that people should pay 
tax in accordance with their ability-to-pay, and that the appropriate measure of ability-to-pay is income. 
45 In contrast, benefit theory has a difficult time justifying the taxation of foreign-source income: 
when income is earned abroad, it is the host country that provides the relevant services. 
46 See, e.g., Fleming et al., supra note 27, at 310–13; Michael S. Kirsch, The Role of Physical 
Presence in the Taxation of Cross-Border Personal Services, 51 B.C. L. REV. 993, 1043–44 (2010); 
Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 478; Paul R. McDaniel, Territorial vs Worldwide International Tax Systems: 
Which is Better for the U.S.?, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 283, 299–300 (2007); John P. Steines, Jr., The Foreign Tax 
Credit at Ninety-Five Bionic Centenarian, 66 TAX L. REV. 545 (2013). 
47 Horizontal equity dictates that similarly situated persons should bear identical tax burdens. See, 
e.g., David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 43 (2006); Ira 
K. Lindsay, Tax Fairness by Convention: A Defense of Horizontal Equity, 19 FLA. TAX REV. 79 (2016); 
James Repetti & Diane Ring, Horizontal Equity Revisited, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 135 (2012); Brian Galle, Tax 
Fairness, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323 (2008). 
48 See, e.g., BRIAN BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE 
PRINCIPLE DOCTRINES IN A THEORY OF JUSTICE BY JOHN RAWLS 128–30 (1973); CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL 
THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 139–41, 143–53 (1979); Loren Lomasky, Toward a Liberal Theory 
of Natural Boundaries, in BOUNDARIES AND JUSTICE 55, 56–60 (David Miller & Sohail H. Hashmi eds., 
2001); THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 240, 250–51 (1989); KOK-CHOR TAN, JUSTICE WITHOUT 
BORDERS: COSMOPOLITANISM, NATIONALISM AND PATRIOTISM 60 (Russell Hardin et al. eds., 2004). 
49 Such a structure might not be possible without a world government with global enforcement 
powers. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113, 115 (2005) (“If 
Hobbes is right, the idea of global justice without a world government is a chimera.”). 
50 DANIEL BELL, COMMUNITARIANISM AND ITS CRITICS 150–51 (1993); MARGARET CANOVAN, 
NATIONHOOD AND POLITICAL THEORY 28–29 (1996); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 208 (1986); WILL 
KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR: NATIONALISM, MULTICULTURALISM AND CITIZENSHIP 225 (2001); 
AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE ETHICS OF MEMORY 74–76 (2002); JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999); 
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of the society, not those of outsiders, that dictate who pays how much tax and how the 
revenue is spent. National legislatures—whether because of a principled rejection of 
cosmopolitanism or because of the practical limits of national sovereignty—adopt the 
latter approach.51 
Consequently, domestic law needs to distinguish between members of the 
collective and outsiders, between those among whom the norms of distributive justice 
apply and those who are beyond the parameters of those norms. While there is no 
universally accepted criterion by which countries delineate which individuals are 
members of the collective and which are not, the common denominator of all such 
criteria is that they reflect an individual’s personal attachments to the society in question. 
Typical criteria include physical presence, habitual abode, personal and social 
attachments, and domicile.52 Under U.S. tax law, the criteria for including an individual 
within the ambit of those whose ability-to-pay is a factor in determining tax liability are 
physical presence,53 citizenship,54 and formal status as a permanent resident (“green card” 
holder).55 Those whom the law views as members of the collective are ordinarily termed 
“residents.” Those whom the law views as outside the collective are ordinarily termed 
“nonresidents” or “foreigners.”56 The goal of the tax system and of the services that it 
funds is to promote the welfare of residents. 
Of course, the welfare interests of residents can conflict. Policies that promote 
the welfare of some may be detrimental to the welfare of others, and this is particularly 
true with regard to taxation. However, this conflict is precisely what the norms of 
distributive justice seek to regulate: given the fact that resources are limited, how should 
                                                                                                                                                   
RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 190–91 (1989); YAEL TAMIR, LIBERAL 
NATIONALISM 121 (1993). 
51 See, e.g., Michael S. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 480 
(2007) (“The threshold question is whether ability-to-pay analysis should adopt a worldwide perspective, 
which would consider the relative incomes of all individuals worldwide, or whether it should adopt a national 
perspective, looking only at the incomes of members of U.S. society (however defined). Commentators who 
have addressed this issue have generally concluded that, for both practical and theoretical reasons, U.S. tax 
policy should take a national perspective.”); SHAVIRO, FIXING, supra note 25, at 98–103. 
52 Ruth Mason, Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 169, 178 (2016) (“States … determine 
residence by evaluating connecting factors such as whether the taxpayer has a dwelling in the jurisdiction, 
whether her family resides there, and whether she has social and economic connections to the jurisdiction.”); 
Edward A. Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation: Citizenship as an Administrable Proxy for 
Domicile, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1289, 1323 (2011) (“Many nations, implicitly or expressly, define residence for 
tax purposes as domicile …”); Daniel Shaviro, Taxing Potential Community Members’ Foreign Source 
Income 2 (New York Univ. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 15-09, 2015), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2625732 [https://perma.cc/88VA-9A4S] (mentioning 
“location of property that one owns in-country, such as a home; the place where one’s primary business or 
other economic ties appear to be located; and the place of residence for close family members.”). 
53 I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(ii), (3). 
54 I.R.C. § 872(a) (excluding foreign source income from the gross income of “nonresident alien 
individuals” and leaving nonresident citizens subject to the general provisions of I.R.C. § 61(a), under which 
“gross income means all income from whatever source derived …”). 
55 I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(i). 
56 Because the United States includes citizens, whatever their other attachments to the country, 
within the collective, the terms employed by U.S. tax law for individuals who outside the collective is 
“nonresident alien.” I.R.C. § 872. Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity the text will refer to those subject to 
tax on their worldwide income as “residents” and to those who are not as “nonresidents” or “foreigners.” In 
the U.S. context, the term “residents” includes nonresident citizens, and the terms “nonresidents” and 
“foreigners” refer to nonresident aliens. 
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they be distributed among the members of the collective?57 Each theory of distributive 
justice effectively provides a matrix by which to evaluate the justice of alternative 
distributions of resources. For example, under a Utilitarian approach, the ideal 
distribution is one that maximizes total welfare.58 Under Rawls’ difference principle, the 
ideal distribution is one that maximizes the well-being of the least well-off segment of 
society.59 Alternative approaches to distributive justice might assign different values to 
efficiency, equality, contribution, need, and so forth and choose other distributions as 
ideal.60 For our purposes, the details and justifications of the various conceptions of 
distributive justice are not important. What is important from our perspective is that each 
considers the effect of public policy on the welfare of the members of the collective and 
attempts, each in its own way, to describe an appropriate balance. 
The welfare of nonresidents is not an essential element of the matrix by which 
national governments determine their tax policy. Granted, relatively wealthy countries 
often provide foreign aid to countries that are less well off. However, there is both a 
qualitative and a quantitative difference between public funds spent on foreign aid and 
public funds spent on services to residents. Qualitatively, the motivation for foreign aid is 
often the promotion of the donor country’s own power or prestige.61 In other words, it is 
the welfare of the donor country’s residents—those who stand to benefit from their 
country’s improved international standing—that serves as the basis of the distributive 
justice matrix. Quantitatively, the amount that countries typically dedicate to foreign aid 
is minuscule relative the amount that they spend promoting the welfare of their own 
residents.62 
 
E. Taxation of Nonresidents 
Under current international usage, countries may and often do impose tax on 
nonresidents who engage in economic activity—including passive investment—within 
                                                      
57 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 35, at 4 (“[A]lthough a society is a cooperative venture for mutual 
advantage, it is typically marked by a conflict as well as by an identity of interests. There is an identity of 
interests since social cooperation makes possible a better life for all than any would have if each were to live 
solely by his own efforts. There is a conflict of interests since persons are not indifferent as to how the greater 
benefits produced by their collaboration are distributed, for in order to pursue their ends they each prefer a 
larger to a lesser share. A set of principles is required for choosing among the various social arrangements 
which determine this division of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper distributive 
shares. These principles are the principles of social justice …”). 
58 See note 34, supra. 
59 See notes 35–37, supra. 
60 See, e.g., Menahem E. Yaari, A Controversial Proposal Concerning Inequality Measurement, 44 
J. OF ECON. THEORY 381 (1988). 
61 See, e.g., A. Cooper Drury, Richard Stuart Olson & Douglas A. Van Belle, The Politics of 
Humanitarian Aid: U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, 1964–1995, 67 J. OF POL. 454 (2005); Andrea Civelli, 
Andrew W. W. Horowitz & Arilton Teixeira, Is Foreign Aid Motivated by Altruism or Self Interest? A 
Theoretical Model and Empirical Test (Feb. 2014), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2390448 [https://perma.cc/2FC5-7KZB]. 
62 In 2015, the nineteen member countries of the OECD’s Development Assistance Council spent 
0.47% of their combined gross national income on foreign aid. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), Development Aid in 2015 Continues to Grow Despite Costs for In-Donor 
Refugees, 3 (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ODA-2015-detailed-summary.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9T5J-UFTM]. In contrast, total government spending by OECD countries in 2015 ranged 
from 29.4% (Ireland) to 57.0% (Finland) of GNP. OECD, General Government Spending (2017), 
https://data.oecd.org/gga/general-government-spending.htm [https://perma.cc/LWE5-PWJV]. 
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their territory. Furthermore, countries often provide tax-funded services to such 
nonresidents. However, the payment of tax and receipt of services does not mean that the 
rights and obligations of distributive justice apply to nonresidents economically active in 
a country. When formulating its policies vis-à-vis nonresidents, it is not the welfare of 
those nonresidents that is of primary concern to the host country, but rather the welfare of 
its own residents. 63  The host country provides services to nonresidents in order to 
encourage investment from which it hopes its residents will benefit. It collects tax from 
nonresidents because doing so allows it to alleviate the tax burden it imposes on its own 
residents or to provide them with more services without increasing their tax payments.64 
The primary practical limitation on taxing nonresidents is that doing so may discourage 
beneficial foreign investment and, as a consequence, negatively affect the welfare of 
residents.65 
The taxation of nonresidents derives not from principles of distributive justice—
as in the case of residents—but rather from principles of commutative justice,66 a concept 
referred to in the tax literature as exchange theory or benefit theory.67 Host countries 
provide services—including granting the right to operate within their sovereign territory, 
to access their markets, and so forth—and are entitled to charge for those services 
whatever the market will bear.68 With regard to nonresidents, the principle of ability to 
pay is irrelevant. The fact that a nonresident pays more tax than a resident who is 
wealthier than she, or less than a resident who is poorer than she, does not ground a claim 
of unjust treatment either of the nonresident (in the former case) or of the resident (in the 
latter). The principle of ability-to-pay applies only among residents. 
Furthermore, although countries that impose income tax ordinarily include 
foreign-source income in the tax base of their individual residents, to the best of my 
knowledge no country attempts to tax the foreign-source income of nonresidents.69 This 
phenomenon too is a consequence of the inapplicability of norms of distributive justice to 
nonresidents. Because the inclusion of foreign-source earnings in the tax base is a 
                                                      
63 Graetz, supra note 2, at 280; Shaviro, supra note 12, at 397. 
64 LEAGUE OF NATIONS REPORT ON DOUBLE TAXATION, supra note 31, at 4044 (“A survey of the 
whole field of recent taxation shows how completely the Governments are dominated by the desire to tax the 
foreigner.”); Shay et al., supra note 27, at 89. 
65 David Elkins, The Merits of Tax Competition in a Globalized Economy, 91 IND. L.J. 905, 932, 
948 (2016). 
66 For a discussion of commutative justice in taxation, see David Elkins, Taxation and the Terms of 
Justice, 41 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 73, 78–82 (2009). 
67 Barker, supra note 11, at 665 (“The exchange or benefit principle of taxation is the primary 
theory that underlies source-based international taxation.”); Fleming et al., supra note 27, at 307 n.13 
(“Because … [the tax regime applicable to nonresidents] usually reaches less than the taxpayer's entire net 
income, it cannot be grounded on ability-to-pay. Instead, it is often rationalized as a benefit-based charge 
imposed by the source country.”); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Designing a 
U.S. Exemption System for Foreign Income When the Treasury Is Empty, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 397, 401 (2012) 
(“[E]very country has a normative claim, based on a benefits-received rationale, to tax income earned by 
foreigners within its borders.”); Lawrence Lokken, The Source of Income from International Uses and 
Disposition of Intellectual Property, 36 TAX L. REV. 235, 239–40 (1981); Herwig J. Schlunk, How I Learned 
to Stop Worrying and Love Double Taxation, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 127, 129–30 (2003); Shay et al., supra 
note 27, at 90–91. 
68 Shay et al., supra note 27, at 95 (“[T]he justification for source taxation cannot be ability to pay 
but instead must be a charge for access to the source country market.”). 
69 Recall that in the case of the United States, the term “resident” in the text refers also to 
nonresident citizens. See note 56, supra. 
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function of the ability-to-pay concept, and because ability-to-pay is inapplicable to 
nonresidents, nonresidents are not subject to tax on their foreign-source income. In 
summation, the distinction between residents and nonresidents is ultimately a distinction 
between those who are subject to taxation according to the standard of ability-to-pay and 
those who are not.70 
 
III. CORPORATE RESIDENCE 
Part II demonstrated that for individuals, residence means a personal connection 
significant enough that one’s welfare is properly taken into account as part of the matrix 
of distributive justice and that one is therefore properly subject to taxation in accordance 
with the principle of ability-to-pay. This Part will examine whether the income tax 
concept of residence is applicable to corporations.  
 
A. Welfare 
Residence is a matter of whose welfare is important. In designing the contours of 
its tax structure, a country’s only or primary concern is promoting the welfare of its own 
residents. The potential impact on the welfare of nonresidents plays little or no role 
(except to the extent that the resultant behavior of nonresidents might affect the welfare 
of residents). Therefore, when we ask which corporations are residents and which are 
nonresidents, we are effectively asking which corporations’ welfare should constitute part 
of the matrix by which we determine economic and social policy. 
Phrasing the question in this manner underscores the absurdity inherent therein. 
However much the law or popular discourse might anthropomorphize the corporate 
entity,71 a corporation is not a sentient being.72 Well-being, in the sense that is relevant to 
distributive justice, is not an attribute of juristic entities.73 Of course, the success or 
failure of a corporation can affect the welfare of individuals and the fate of the corporate 
enterprise is consequently of interest for public policy, but it is the welfare of the affected 
                                                      
70 For a discussion of “[t]he paradox [that i]f you’re among ‘us’ and we care about you, you lose … 
since it means that [you] may have to pay tax on [your foreign source income],” see Shaviro, supra note 52, 
at 24–29. (emphasis removed). 
71 See, e.g., Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: 
Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability, 11 SYDNEY L. REV. 468, 482 (1988) (“We often react to 
corporate offenders not merely as impersonal harm-producing forces but as responsible, blameworthy 
entities.”) (footnote omitted). 
72 See, e.g., ROBERT B. REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF BUSINESS, 
DEMOCRACY, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 216 (2007) (“A final truth that needs to be emphasized—the most basic of 
all—is that corporations are not people.”). 
73 See William B. Barker, A Common Sense Corporate Tax: The Case for a Destination-Based, 
Cash Flow Tax on Corporations, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 955, 1000 (2012) (“Corporations have control over 
resources, but, as artificial persons, their relation to the state and society cannot be described in the same way 
as individuals.”) (footnote omitted); Fleming et al., supra note 27, at 319 (“This taxation scheme cannot be 
explained on ability-to-pay grounds because liability under the corporate-level tax is calibrated to the taxable 
income of the corporation and bears no necessary relationship to the respective abilities to pay of any 
individuals.”) (footnote omitted); Shaviro, supra note 12, at 395 (“[C]orporations are not sentient beings, and 
cannot feel benefits or burdens. Thus, they are not directly of normative interest. Relevant distributional goals 
can only relate to people.”). 
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individuals rather than the success or failure of the corporation that has normative and 
economic import.74 
In the literal, descriptive sense of the term, a corporation has an ability-to-pay 
tax. Its ability-to-pay is equal to its net equity, the totality of its assets, or the whole of its 
income: the government simply cannot take more than that amount.75 However, we have 
already noted that in the context of tax policy, the concept of ability-to-pay is not 
descriptive or absolute, but rather prescriptive and relative.76 It compares the effect of 
paying tax on the welfare of various taxpayers and evaluates which tax schemes most 
closely conform to the relevant conception of distributive justice. In this sense of the 
term, corporations have no ability-to-pay tax because there is no such thing as the welfare 
of a corporation.77 
The primary purpose for distinguishing between residents and non-residents is 
that residents and only residents are properly subject to ability-to-pay taxation. The fact 
that the principle of ability-to-pay is inapplicable to the corporate entity means that 
residence too is inapplicable to the corporate entity.     
 
B. Personal Connections 
The principle of ability-to-pay applies to those with a substantial personal 
connection to the country concerned.78 Purely economic connections, however extensive, 
are in themselves insufficient to invoke the rights and obligations of distributive justice 
that underlie ability-to-pay taxation. Granted, in borderline cases, when an individual has 
strong personal connections to more than one country, economic connections might be 
relevant in determining residence. For example, most income tax treaties include among 
their “tie-breaking” rules, used to assign residence when an individual is a resident of 
both contracting states under their domestic laws, a reference to the country “with which 
his personal and economic relations are closer (center of vital interests).”79 Nevertheless, 
                                                      
74 Despite its reputation as the dismal science, “[t]he ultimate goal of economic science is to 
improve the living conditions of people in their everyday lives.” PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. 
NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 7 (2010). 
75 Whether the measure of descriptive (as opposed to normative) ability-to-pay is equity, assets, or 
income is a matter of definition. If ability-to-pay means the most that a corporation could pay while retaining 
enough assets to repay its creditors, then its ability-to-pay is equal to its equity.  If ability-to-pay means the 
most the government could take without regard to the claims of creditors, then the corporation’s ability-to-
pay is equal to the totality of its assets (although one might reasonably argue that the ability-to-pay of the 
corporation is limited to its equity and that any amount taken beyond that is part of the ability-to-pay of the 
creditors). If ability-to-pay means the most the government could take while allowing the corporation to 
continue functioning indefinitely, then the corporation’s ability-to-pay is equal to the whole of its periodic 
income. 
76 See supra text accompanying note 41. 
77 Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through Corporate-Shareholder 
Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 265, 274 (1995) (“The ability to pay norm … is … a maxim … of tax 
fairness, which has to do with how the aggregate burden of taxation should be apportioned among 
individuals. Thus, saying that a public corporation has a separate ability to pay does not justify its being 
treated as a separate taxable unit from a fairness perspective, other than as … perhaps a withholding vehicle 
pending dividend distributions.”) (footnotes omitted); Marian, supra note 1, at 1616 (“Scholars agree … that 
for tax purposes, corporations are not real beings. Rather, corporations are instruments for the taxation of 
individuals.”) (footnotes omitted). 
78 See supra Part II.D. 
79 See, e.g., UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION, art. 4, ¶ (3)(a) (2016); U.N. DEP’T 
OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, U.N. MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND 
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a number of caveats are in order. First, the United States, the OECD, and the UN model 
income tax conventions all rely on an initial tie-breaking rule that involves a purely 
personal connection: the place of the individual’s permanent home. Only if the permanent 
home test does not resolve the issue—either because the individual has a permanent 
home in both countries or because she does not have a permanent home in either 
country—do the treaties invoke “center of vital interests” as a secondary tie-breaker.80  
Second, the primary focus of the “center of vital interests” test itself is the individual’s 
personal, not economic, connections.81  Third, and perhaps most important, economic 
connections can never establish residency. The basis for residence is the country’s 
determination, under its domestic laws, that the individual has a sufficient personal nexus 
to the country.82 The economic connection serves merely to limit a country’s right to tax 
an individual, despite the personal connection, because of the individual’s stronger 
connection to another country. 
The emphasis on an individual’s personal connection to a country is not 
capricious. Those personal connections that bind members of a community together 
function as a trigger for the rights and obligations of distributive justice that underlie 
ability-to-pay taxation. Assume, for instance, that one of the obligations of distributive 
justice is a duty to provide some level of support to those who are incapable of providing 
for their own needs. Now consider the case of an individual whose sole connection to a 
country is economic. Perhaps she owns income-producing property in the country. 
Perhaps she even has active business interests in the country. Should she become 
destitute for whatever reason, she would have no claim under the terms of distributive 
justice for support from the host country. The country that she would need to turn to for 
support would be her own country of residence, the one with which she maintains her 
strongest personal connections. 
Of course, the fact that economic connections cannot serve as the basis for 
individual residence does not mean that economic connections cannot serve as the basis 
for the imposition of tax. As a sovereign entity, a country has a right under international 
                                                                                                                                                   
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, art. 4, ¶ (2)(a), (2011); OECD, Articles of the Model Tax Convention with Respect 
to Taxes on Income and on Capital, art. 4, ¶ (2)(a) (Jan. 28, 2003). 
80 UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION, supra note 79, at art. 4, ¶ (3)(a); U.N. DEP’T 
OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, supra note 79, at art. 4, ¶ (2)(a); OECD, supra note 79, at art. 4, ¶ (2)(a). The 
Commentary to the OECD Model Income Tax Convention C(4)–5 states that “[t]he Article gives preference 
to the Contracting State in which individual has a permanent home available to him. This criterion will 
frequently be sufficient to solve the conflict …” OECD, Commentaries on the Articles of the Convention, 86 
(2010). The United States Model Technical Explanation Accompanying the United States Model Income Tax 
Convention of November 15, 2006 ([the government has not yet published a technical explanation of the 
2016 model treaty] clarifies that “[t]hese tests are to be applied in the order in which they are stated.”), 
available at https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/hp16802.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CQ8C-PBY2]. 
81 The Commentary to the OECD Model Income Tax Convention C(4)–6 explains the “centre of 
vital interest” test as follows: “regard will be had to his family and social relations, his occupations, his 
political, cultural or other activities, his place of business, the place from which he administers his property, 
etc. The circumstances must be examined as a whole, but it is nevertheless obvious that consideration based 
on the personal acts of the individual must receive special attention.” OECD, supra note 80, at 87. 
82 See, e.g., UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION, supra note 79, at art. 4, ¶ (3)(a); 
OECD, supra note 79, at  art. 4, ¶ (1) (“the term ‘resident of a Contracting State’ means any person who, 
under the laws of that [Contracting] State, is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, residence, 
[citizenship] … or any other criterion of a similar nature …”). The corresponding Articles of the OECD and 
UN Model Tax Treaties are identical, except that they do not include citizenship as a criterion of residence. 
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law to charge nonresidents for access to its territory and its markets.83 In the field of 
income taxation, this means that countries have the right to impose tax on nonresidents 
for income derived from domestic sources.84 They do not have the right to impose tax on 
the foreign-source income of nonresidents. 
Corporations have no personal connections. Due to their nature as juristic 
persons, the only type of connection that they can have with a country is economic. The 
country with which it has such a connection may impose tax on the income that the 
corporation derives from its economic involvement with the country. However, because 
an economic connection by itself is insufficient to establish a right to impose tax on 
foreign-source income and because a corporation cannot have any connection other than 
economic, there can be no justification for imposing tax on a corporation’s foreign-source 
income. 
Consider the leading case of De Beers, decided by the House of Lords in 1906.85 
De Beers concerned the question of when a corporation is a United Kingdom resident for 
the purpose of the corporate income tax. Under UK law at the time, a person residing in 
the United Kingdom was liable for tax on annual profits “from any kind of property, 
whether situated in the United Kingdom or elsewhere” and “from any profession, trade, 
employment, or vacation, whether the same shall be respectively carried on in the United 
Kingdom or elsewhere.”86 The problem facing the House of Lords was that residence is a 
term that conceptually applies to individuals, not to corporations: “it is easy to ascertain 
where an individual resides, but when the inquiry relates to a company, which in a natural 
sense does not reside anywhere, some artificial test must be applied.”87 
The House of Lords decided that in determining the residence of a corporation, 
one should “proceed as nearly as we can upon the analogy of an individual.”88 The 
question was then how to analogize, with regard to residence, from a natural person to an 
artificial person when the terms of reference relate specifically to those characteristics of 
the former that are absent in the case of the latter. The taxpayer argued that a corporation 
resides in the country in which it is registered and that, registered in South Africa, it was 
a resident of that territory and not of the United Kingdom. In rejecting this argument, the 
House of Lords viewed registration as corresponding not to an individual’s residence but 
rather to an individual’s citizenship. De Beers was in an analogous position to a citizen of 
South Africa. However, just as an individual who is a foreign national may reside in the 
United Kingdom, so too a corporation registered abroad may be a UK resident.89 
                                                      
83 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1987); Nancy H. 
Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of International Income, 29 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 145, 198 (1998) (“A 
finding that … part of one or more [of] the considerations relevant to economic allegiance … occurs within 
the territory … of a state is [enough] to endow that state with a competence to tax the income thus produced 
…”); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law, 57 TAX L. REV. 483, 490 (2004) (“The 
right of countries to tax income arising in their territory is well established in international law.”). 
84 While host countries have the right to tax the domestic source income of nonresidents who 
operate within their territory, I have argued elsewhere that income is not an appropriate base for taxing 
nonresidents. See generally David Elkins, The Case Against Income Taxation of Multinational Enterprises, 
36 VA. TAX REV. 143 (2017). 
85 De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. Howe [1906] AC 455 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
86 Id. at 457–58 (quoting Section 2 of the Income Tax Act 1853, Schedule D). 
87 Id. at 458. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
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What then are the characteristics of a corporation that are analogous to the 
residence of an individual? “A company cannot eat or sleep,” the House of Lords noted, 
“but it can keep house and do business. We ought, therefore to see where it really keeps 
house and does business.”90 In other words, for individuals, residence is a function of 
various aspects of their personal lives (where they eat and sleep). A corporation has no 
personal life. All it has is a business life. The House of Lords therefore analogized 
between the personal life of an individual and the business life of a corporation and 
determined that a corporation is a resident of the country in which it conducts its 
business. Of course, this leaves open the question of where a multinational corporation 
conducts its business. In the case of De Beers, its head office was in South Africa, it held 
its general meetings in South Africa, its mines were in South Africa, it delivered its 
diamonds to purchasers in South Africa, some of the directors and life governors lived in 
South Africa, and some of the directors’ meeting were held in South Africa. 91 
Nevertheless, the House of Lords was of the opinion that “the real business is carried on 
where the central management and control actually abides” and not where its business 
operations are located.92 In the case of De Beers, “the majority of directors and life 
governors live in England [and] the directors’ meetings in London are the meetings 
where the real control is always exercised …” 93  Consequently, the House of Lords 
concluded that the corporation was a resident of the United Kingdom and was liable for 
UK tax on its worldwide income.94 
For our purposes, the significance of De Beers is not the central management and 
control test, but rather the fact that the House of Lords relied upon the analogy between 
the personal life of an individual and the business life of a corporation. Upon closer 
examination, this analogy turns out to be false. Individuals have both business lives and 
personal lives. Their personal lives, as appropriate to the terms of distributive justice that 
underlie the income tax, determine where they are subject to worldwide taxation.95 Their 
business lives—that is, the location of their investments and their business interests, 
where they work, and so forth—determine where they are subject to territorial taxation. 
An individual’s business interests, however extensive, are by themselves insufficient to 
trigger residence and to subject the individual to tax on foreign-source income.96 In 
                                                      
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 458–59. 
92 Id. at. 458. 
93 Id. at 459. 
94 For a review of the development of the central management and control test in UK case law 
following De Beers, see William M. Funk, On and Over the Horizon: Emerging Issues in U.S. Taxation of 
Investment, 10 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L. J. 1, 24–28 (2010); Tillinghast, supra note 1, at 261–62. In 1988, 
Parliament expanded the common law definition of residents by providing that a corporation incorporated in 
the United Kingdom is a UK corporation regardless of where it is controlled and managed. Finance Act 1988, 
c. 39 (UK), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/39/contents; STEPHAN RAMMELOO, CORPORATIONS IN 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 135 (2001). Since 1965 Canadian income tax law 
has no statutory definition of corporate residence, except for a provision that companies incorporated in 
Canada after April 26, 1965 are deemed to be residents of Canada. In determining residence beyond the 
statutory provision, Canadian courts generally follow UK case law. Michael S. Schadewald & Tracy A. 
Kaye, Source of Income Rules and Treaty Relief from Double Taxation within the NAFTA Trading Bloc, 61 
LA. L. REV. 353, 363 (2001). 
95 See supra Subpart B. 
96 Cf. John K. Sweet, Formulating International Tax Laws in the Age of Electronic Commerce: The 
Possible Ascendancy of Residence-Based Taxation in an Era of Eroding Traditional Income Tax Principles, 
146 U. PA. L. REV. 1949, 1993 (1998) (“Unlike individuals, corporations, especially multinational 
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contrast to individuals, corporations have no personal lives; they only have business 
lives.97 Therefore, a proper analogy between individuals and corporations would lead to 
an opposite conclusion than that arrived at by the House of Lords. Corporations should be 
subject to territorial taxation wherever they have economic interests and should nowhere 
be subject to worldwide taxation.98 In other words, the ontological nature of a corporation 
precludes it from being a resident of any country.    
 
C. The Categorical Imperative 
On a deeper philosophical level, taxation in accordance with ability-to-pay, much 
more so than competing theories, reflects the Kantian imperative always to treat rational 
beings not merely as means but always also as ends.99 Under benefit theory, for example, 
the primary goal of taxation is to prevent a free ride by those who would benefit from 
public services without paying for them. By requiring that all persons contribute in 
accordance with the value that they receive, the tax prevents unjust enrichment. 
Effectively, it views government as a means of overcoming market failure:  the 
government provides services that the market cannot and covers the cost by charging 
each person a fair price for value received.100 Factors such as need and relative well-being 
are irrelevant under benefit theory: what one pays is a function of what one gets. Of 
course, it is difficult in practice to correlate benefits and payments precisely, and scholars 
have for centuries debated the question of how much each strata of society benefits from 
                                                                                                                                                   
enterprises, may operate in multiple places at any given time, rendering it difficult to determine the official 
‘residence’ of any particular corporation.”). It is not clear why individuals, like corporations, cannot operate 
in multiple places at any given time. Like a corporation, an individual may have business interests and other 
investments in various places around the globe. 
97 Barker, supra note 73, at 1001 (“The essence of the individual's relationship is totality; 
individuals are social, political, and economic actors. The essence of a corporation's relationship is primarily 
economic.”). 
98 Cf. an earlier nontax case, Cesena Sulphur Co. v. Nicholson [1876] 1 Exch. Div. 28, 452 (Eng.).  
(“The use of the word ‘residence’ is founded upon the habits of a natural man, and is therefore inapplicable to 
the artificial and legal person whom we call a corporation.”). 
99 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 95–98 (H. J. Paton trans., 
1964) (1785) [hereinafter KANT, GROUNDWORK]. Kant claimed that his three formulations of the categorical 
imperative—maxims must be chosen as if they were to hold as universal laws of nature, a rational being is by 
its nature an end in itself, and all maxims ought to harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends—are 
substantively identical. Id. at 103–04. The question of whether they actually are has been the subject of 
philosophical debate. In any case, the text focuses on the second formulation of the imperative. For Kant’s 
own view of what we today refer to as distributive justice, see, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 
179 (Peter Heath & J.B. Schneewind eds., Peter Heath trans., 1997) (“[I]f we … do a kindness to an 
unfortunate, we have not made a free gift to him, but repaid him what we were helping to take away through 
a general injustice. For if none might appropriate more of this world’s goods than his neighbor, there would 
be no rich folk, but also no poor. Thus even acts of kindness are acts of duty and indebtedness, arising from 
the rights of others.”). 
Rawls expressed his version of the Kantian imperative as it applies to distributive justice when he 
charged that “Utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons.” RAWLS, supra note 35, 
at 24. Interestingly, Nozick hurled the same charge against Rawls’ own difference principle. NOZICK, supra 
note 43, at 228. 
100 See, e.g., C.V. BROWN & P.M. JACKSON, PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS 27–60 (1990); DAVID N. 
HYMAN, PUBLIC FINANCE: A CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF THEORY TO POLICY 67–68 (2014). 
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government services.101 Nevertheless, the overriding principle is that tax burdens should 
correlate as nearly as possible with value actually received.102 
Ability-to-pay, on the other hand, looks more to the person than to the service 
that the person receives. Instead of viewing taxpayers merely as a means of financing 
public expenditures and inquiring how the distribute the burden most fairly, it views them 
as people with needs and desires and it places at the forefront of the discourse not what 
the person received from the government but how the payment of tax will affect that 
person’s welfare. Although both benefit theory and ability-to-pay ultimately view persons 
as ends—under benefit theory, tax is a means by which the government provides 
taxpayers with welfare-enhancing services103—ability-to-pay takes the imperative one 
step further by applying it not only to the government’s expenditure function but also to 
its tax collecting function. It effectively posits that when structuring the tax system, we 
should treat people also as ends in themselves and not merely as sources of revenue. 
Does the Kantian imperative dictate our relationship to the legal person known as 
a corporation? In introducing this formulation of the categorical imperative, Kant writes 
as follows: 
Suppose, however, that there were something whose existence has in itself an 
absolute value, something which as an end in itself could be a ground of 
determinate law; then in it, and in it alone, would there be a ground of a possible 
categorical imperative— that is, of a practical law. 
Now I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in 
himself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will; he must in all 
his actions, whether they are directed to himself or to other rational beings, 
always be viewed at the same time as an end.104 
                                                      
101 See, e.g., HOBBES, supra note 31, at 238; SMITH, supra note 31, at 310; MILL, PRINCIPLES, supra 
note 31, at 156–57. 
102 Schoenblum, supra note 34, at 233 n.52; David G. Duff, Benefit Taxes and User Fees in Theory 
and Practice, 54 UNIV. OF TORONTO L. J. 391, 405–06 (2004); Elkins, supra note 65, at 80; Marjorie E. 
Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 
MICH. L. REV. 465, 483–84 (1987). 
103 Benefit theory emerged during the Age of Reason as a corollary to the theory of the social 
contract. In medieval times, monarchs ruled by right, and taxation, although often subject to the dictates of 
custom with regard to manner and method, was one of the quintessential prerogatives of monarchs, who 
depended upon tax revenue to support themselves and their court. Klaus Vogel, The Justification for 
Taxation: A Forgotten Question, 33 AM. J. JURIS. 19, 25 (1988) (“Scholastic literature provides a list of 
examples of permissible purposes for taxation, including funding military armament, the living expenses of 
the sovereign, ransom of the sovereign from imprisonment, and the dowry for his daughters.”); MAURICE 
KEEN, ENGLAND IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES 33–34 (2003); SIMONS, supra note 31, at 3–4 (noting that prior 
to the French revolution, taxes imposed on the commoners supported the tax-exempt aristocracy and clergy); 
Joseph M. Dodge, Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit, Partnership, and Ability-to-Pay 
Principles, 58 TAX L. REV. 399, 399 (2005). In contrast, the Enlightenment’s theory of social contract posits 
that governments exist to protect and serve the governed and that taxes are payments by the public for 
services they receive from the state. HOBBES, supra note 31, at 238; JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT § 138 (1689); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, in SOCIAL CONTRACT 167 (Ernest 
Barker ed., 1962).); cf. David Hume, Of the Original Contract, in SOCIAL CONTRACT 145–66 (Ernest Barker 
ed., 1962) (rejecting the concept of an original contract based on freely given consent). 
104 KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 99, at 95 (italics in the original). 
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Corporations are not rational beings in the Kantian sense of the term.105 They do 
not exist as ends inthemselves, but are rather means for the furthering of human welfare. 
Consider, for example, Jonathan Swift’s satirical proposal to raise children for food.106 
One reason that the proposal is morally repugnant is that it treats people as 
commodities.107 Such prohibitions do not apply to our treatment of corporations. Forming 
a corporation in order to exploit it for economic gain and dissolving it when the cost of 
maintaining its legal personhood exceeds the benefits it provides is morally permissible. 
Granted, the extent to which a corporation is a person has generated vociferous 
debate in recent years. In Citizens United, the Supreme Court held that corporations have 
the constitutional right to engage in political speech.108 The academic literature almost 
unanimously disagrees.109 Some philosophers have argued that the corporation is a moral 
agent with moral duties in its own right (i.e., beyond those it has by virtue of acting as 
agent for its various stakeholders).110 Others deny the corporate entity capable of bearing 
moral duties.111 Nevertheless, to the best of my knowledge, no commentator in any field 
has gone so far as to advance the view that corporations are entitled to treatment as 
Kantian “rational beings.” In fact, one argument raised against the idea of corporate 
                                                      
105 Malla Pollack, The Romantic Corporation: Trademark, Trust, and Tyranny, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 
81, 108 (2012) (“Any likeness between a Kantian-self and a business firm is purely metaphorical.”). 
106 Jonathan Swift, A Modest Proposal for Preventing the Children of Poor People From Being a 
Burden to Their Parents or Country and For Making Them Beneficial to the Publick, in A MODEST PROPOSAL 
AND OTHER SATIRES 226 (2004). 
107 George Wittkowsky, Swift’s Modest Proposal: The Biography of an Early Georgian Pamphlet, 
4 J. OF THE HIST. OF IDEAS 75, 101 (1943). 
108 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
109 See, e.g., Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too Much of a Good Thing: Campaign Speech After Citizens 
United, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2365 (2010); William Alan Nelson II, Buying the Electorate: An Empirical 
Study of the Current Campaign Finance Landscape and How the Supreme Court Erred in Not Revisiting 
Citizens United, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 443 (2013); Ganash Sitaraman, Contracting Around Citizens United, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 755 (2014); Amy J. Sepinwall, Citizens United and the Ineluctable Question of 
Corporate Citizenship, 44 CONN. L. REV. 575 (2012); James A. Gardner, Anti-Regulatory Absolutism in the 
Campaign Arena: Citizens United and the Implied Slippery Slope, 20 CORNELL L. & PUB. POL’Y 673, 674 
(2011) (“[T]he Court’s decision in Citizens United was subjected immediately to severe criticism from 
regulators, academics, journalists, and citizens.”); Jocelyn Benson, Saving Democracy: A Blueprint for 
Reform in the Post-Citizens United Era, 40 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 723 (2012). 
110 PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1984); PETER A. FRENCH, 
CORPORATE ETHICS (1995); PATRICIA J. WERHANE, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND CORPORATIONS (1985); Wim 
Dubbink & Jeffery Smith, A Political Account of Corporate Moral Responsibility, 14 ETHICAL THEORY & 
MORAL PRAC. 223 (2010); Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207 (1979); 
Rita C. Manning, Corporate Responsibility and Corporate Personhood, 3 J. BUS. ETHICS 77 (1984); Michael 
J. Phillips, Corporate Moral Personhood and Three Conceptions of the Corporation, 2 BUS. ETHICS Q. 435 
(1992). 
111 THOMAS DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS AND MORALITY 20–23 (1982); Peter Arenella, Convicting 
the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. 
REV. 1511 (1992); John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329 (2009); Manuel G. Velasquez, Why Corporations Are Not Morally 
Responsible for Anything They Do, BUS. & PROF. ETHICS J. (1983); Thomas Weigend, Societas Delinquere 
Non Potest?, 6 J. INT. CRIM. JUST. 927 (2008); Susan Wolf, The Legal and Moral Responsibility of 
Organizations, 27 CRIM. JUST. 267 (1985); G. Sullivan, Expressing Corporate Guilt, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 281 (1995) (reviewing CELIA WELLS, CORPORATIONS AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (1993)). 
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moral agency is that corporations clearly have no rights under the terms of distributive 
justice.112  
If the concept of residence in the field of income taxation delineates the universe 
of persons for whom the overriding principle in determining their tax liability is ability-
to-pay, if ability-to-pay reflects the idea that we are obliged to treat people not only as 
means but also as ends, and if corporations are not ends but merely means, then residence 
cannot be an attribute of corporations.        
 
D. Incorporeality 
Commentators have posited that the problem with assigning residence to 
corporations stems from their incorporeality. For example, Professors Fleming, Peroni, 
and Shay have observed that “precisely because corporations are fictional, they do not 
live anywhere. Thus, determining where a corporation resides is a much more difficult 
endeavor than determining the residence of a human being.”113 According to Professor 
Rosenzweig, the "difficulty with defining residency for entities is that the most 
straightforward way to define residency—physical presence—is not available, simply 
because legal entities cannot be physically present in the same manner as individuals.”114 
While it is certainly true that the incorporeality of a corporation renders 
inapplicable the classic determinants of individual residence (physical presence, habitual 
abode, and so forth), I believe that the fundamental issue goes much deeper. The fact that 
an individual lives, or is physically present in, a certain place does not have independent 
normative significance. The reason that the law relies upon these factors is that the law 
views them as indicative of membership in a collective to which the norms of distributive 
justice apply.115 If, counterfactually, a corporation could be the subject of distributive 
justice, the law would properly seek indicia of corporate membership in the relevant 
community. However, corporations cannot be members of a community to which norms 
of distributive justice apply, not because they cannot be present in a physical place, but 
rather because they have no personal identity, do not experience well-being in the 
relevant sense of the term, have no personal connections, and are not Kantian rational 
beings.116 
As a perhaps bizarre, but hopefully insightful thought experiment, imagine that 
there exist communities of disembodied spirits, that each community possesses resources 
that can produce (their equivalent of) happiness or reduce (their equivalent of) suffering 
and that each community has a set of rules to determine who is required to contribute to 
(and is entitled to benefit from) the communal resources. Due to their nature, the rules 
that these spirits would adopt to delineate community membership would likely be quite 
different from ours (whether they would use the terms “residence” or some other term 
                                                      
112 Donaldson, supra note 111, at 23 (“[I]t seems implausible that [corporations] should have to the 
right … to draw Social Security benefits.”). 
113 Fleming et al., supra note 23, at 1683 (emphasis in the original). 
114 Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 479–80. 
115 Shaviro, supra note 52, at 21 (describing physical location as one factor “that would appear to 
have strong intuitive appeal, when one thinks about the ‘us’ category …”). 
116 A similar issue arises with regard to the application of criminal law to corporations. See Albert 
W. Alschuler, Ancient Law and the Punishment of Corporations: of Frankpledge and Deodand, 71 B.U. L. 
REV. 307 (1991); Weigend, supra note 111. See also Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 833, 841–43 (2000). 
2017] THE MYTH OF CORPORATE TAX RESIDENCE 29 
more appropriate to their circumstances is irrelevant). Their rules would reflect whatever 
type of connection that they considered pertinent in determining who was a member of 
the relevant community and who was not. 
These disembodied spirits share with corporations the attribute that they are 
incorporeal, and consequently, cannot live or be physically present anywhere as can 
human beings. Nevertheless, because they share with humans the attributes of having 
personal identity and personal connections, of experiencing (their equivalent of) 
happiness and suffering and of being Kantian rational beings, it would be reasonable for 
them to develop a system of distributive justice and to adopt rules by which to determine 
who is subject to the rights and obligations of that system.117 It is because corporations 
lack these attributes—and not because, as incorporeal persons, they do not “reside” 
anywhere —that they cannot be members of a collective to which the norms of 
distributive justice apply.   
 
IV. TAXING CORPORATIONS AND TAXING SHAREHOLDERS  
The conclusion so far, that the concept of residence is inapplicable to 
corporations, means that the distinction between domestic corporations and foreign 
corporations is incongruous for tax purposes. Granted, there are corporations with 
economic ties to various countries, just as there are individuals with economic ties to 
various countries. Under the norms of international tax law, those countries are justified 
in imposing taxes as they see fit on the income allocable to those economic ties.118 
                                                      
117 Kant explicitly entertained the possibility of nonhuman rational beings and averred that the 
moral law would apply to them. “[U]nless we wish to deny to the concept of morality all truth and all relation 
to a possible object, we cannot dispute that its law is of such widespread significance as to hold, not merely 
for men, but for all rational being as such …”. KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 99, at 76 (italics in the 
original). 
118 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 402(1)(a) (AM. LAW. INST. 
1987); Avi-Yonah, supra note 83, at 490 (“The right of countries to tax income arising in their territory is 
well established in international law.”). 
The question of how to allocate a corporation’s income among the various countries in which it 
operates has attracted significant attention in recent years. One current proposal is a formulary approach, in 
which you allocate the corporation’s income to the various countries with which it has economic ties. Avi-
Yonah et al., Allocating, supra note 25 at 501; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Ilan Benshalom, Formulary 
Apportionment: Myths and Prospects— Promoting Better International Policy and Utilizing the 
Misunderstood and Under-Theorized Formulary Alternative, 3 WORLD TAX J. 371 (2011); Benshalom, supra 
note 25; Ilan Benshalom, Taxing the Financial Income of Multinational Enterprises by Employing a Hybrid 
Formulary and Arm’s Length Allocation Method, 28 VA. TAX REV. 619 (2009); Eric T. Laity, The 
Competence of Nations and International Tax Law, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 187, 239–42 (2009); 
Kimberly A. Clausing & Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A 
Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment, The Hamilton Project (Policy Brief No. 2007–08, 2007), 
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/legacy/files/downloads_and_links/Reforming_Corporate_Taxation_in
_a_Global_Economy-_A_Proposal_to_Adopt_Formulary_Apportionment_Brief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MSQ3-JJCJ]; Benshalom, supra note 25. For critique of the formulary apportionment 
model, see J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Formulary Apportionment in the U.S. 
International Income Tax System: Putting Lipstick on a Pig?, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 2−3, 7 (2014); Roin, 
supra note 26. But see OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 14 (2013), available at 
www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZE6N-XPV4] (“[T]here is consensus among 
governments that moving to a system of formulary apportionment of profits is not a viable way forward; it is 
also unclear that the behavioural changes companies might adopt in response to the use of a formula would 
lead to investment decisions that are more efficient and tax-neutral than under a separate entity approach.”). 
Nevertheless, the OECD may have taken the first step toward implementing such a scheme by requiring 
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However, the mere fact that a taxpayer—whether individual or corporate—has economic 
ties to a country does not warrant the imposition of a tax on foreign-source income. 
Nevertheless, it is crucial to distinguish between corporations and their 
shareholders. In contrast to the corporation in which they own shares, individual 
shareholders can be residents of a country. As such, and in accordance with the principle 
of ability-to-pay, resident shareholders would need to account for their accession to 
wealth derived from shareholding. The only question is how best to do so.  
In the domestic arena, the primary means by which shareholders are subject to 
tax on their accession to wealth is the corporate income tax,119 which effectively operates 
as an indirect tax on shareholders.120 However, in the international arena, imposing tax on 
the corporate entity as a proxy for taxing individual shareholders is not a feasible solution 
                                                                                                                                                   
country-by-country reporting. OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT: TRANSFER 
PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING, ACTION 13 – 2015 FINAL REPORT 12, 16, 
29−57 (2015), http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing-documentation-and-country-by-country-reporting-
action-13-2015-final-report-9789264241480-en.htm [https://perma.cc/F5CG-GHCL]. See also EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, COMMON CONSOLIDATED CORPORATE TAX BASE (2016), available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/common-consolidated-corporate-tax-base-
ccctb_en [https://perma.cc/U7KP-PHG3] (The European Union’s proposal to reinstitute the Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)). 
119 The text reflects the prevailing view among scholars—a view to which I subscribe—that, 
whatever the historical context in which it arose, the corporation income tax today functions as an 
administratively convenient indirect tax on shareholders. See, e.g., Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in 
the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 452 (2001); Steven A. Bank, The 
Dividend Divide in Anglo-American Corporate Taxation, 30 J. CORP. L. 1, 15–18 (2004); William B. Barker, 
A Common Sense Corporate Tax: The Case for a Destination-Based, Cash-Flow Tax on Corporations, 61 
CATH. U.L. REV. 955, 996 (2012) (describing “the widespread belief that taxing corporations offers a 
convenient and practical way of indirectly taxing corporate shareholders.”); Fleming et al., supra note 23 at 
1693; Graetz, supra note 2 at 302–03; Kleinbard, supra note 23 at 159; David M. Schizer, Between Scylla 
and Charybdis: Taxing Corporations or Shareholders (or Both), 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1849 (2016). 
Support for this view can be found in the fact that in certain circumstances, the law permits 
corporations and their shareholders to choose whether the corporation will pay tax on its income or whether 
the corporation will be exempt from tax and instead shareholders will pay tax directly on their proportionate 
share of the corporation’s income. I.R.C. §§ 1361–79 (S corporations). See also the “check-the-box” rules 
that apply to limited liability companies (LLCs) and certain other entities. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701–3. 
For other views, see Avi-Yonah, supra note 27 at 1025–26; Jane G. Granville, The Corporate Income Tax: A 
Persistent Challenge, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 73 (2011); Marjorie Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the 
Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND.  L.J. 53 (1990); Marian, supra note 1 at 1647; Ajay K. 
Mehrotra, The Public Control of Corporate Power: Revisiting the 1909 U.S. Corporate Tax from a 
Comparative Perspective, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 497, 510 (2010).  
Under current law, shareholders, in addition to bearing the indirect corporate-level tax, bear an 
additional shareholder-level tax when they receive dividends or sell their shares, although the shareholder-
level tax rate is considerably less that the rate to which individuals are ordinarily subject. I.R.C. §§ 1(h)(11), 
61(a)(7). The result is a “partially integrated” corporate tax structure. However, a comprehensive analysis of 
the corporate tax structure and a comparison among integrated, partially integrated, and double (or “classic”) 
tax systems is beyond the scope of this article. See generally KAREN C. BURKE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 
OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 388–403 (2003). 
120 It is important to distinguish between the nature of a tax as direct or indirect and the incidence of 
the tax. The corporate income tax is an indirect tax on shareholders because its immediate effect is to reduce 
the after-tax profit available for distribution to shareholders. With regard to the incidence of the tax, the 
corporate income tax may affect the supply and demand curves for goods, services, and capital, and if so then 
individuals other than shareholders may bear the ultimate economic burden. However, this is true also with 
regard to a tax imposed directly on shareholders, as it is with regard to a tax imposed directly on wage 
earners and so forth. See generally DAVID ELKINS, BEHIND THE SCENES OF CORPORATE TAXATION 10–12 
(2013). 
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to the problem of taxing shareholders’ accession to wealth. In order to reach the income 
of all resident individuals, a country would need to tax the worldwide income of every 
corporation on the planet, or at least of every corporation with at least one domestic 
shareholder. Even if it were within the power of a country to impose and enforce a 
worldwide corporate income tax, such a tax would constitute unjustifiable overreaching.  
Current law does not attempt to tax the foreign-source income of all 
corporations. 121  Instead, it distinguishes between corporations that it categorizes as 
“domestic” and those that it categorizes as “foreign,” and then imposes tax on the 
worldwide income of the former and on the domestic-source income of the latter.122 
However, this approach is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. It is over-inclusive 
because nonresidents who hold shares in “domestic corporations” are effectively subject 
to tax on their worldwide income. It is under-inclusive because residents who hold shares 
in “foreign corporations” are effectively subject to tax only on their U.S.-source 
income.123 The problem here is not the particular test used to distinguish between foreign 
and domestic corporations. The problem is that, however, the law makes the distinction, 
residents who own shares in “foreign corporations” (however defined) will effectively 
escape taxation on their accession to wealth attributable to the corporation’s foreign-
source earnings and nonresidents who own shares in “domestic corporations” (however 
defined) will effectively be subject to U.S. income tax on income that is not U.S.-source. 
The corporate tax regime confronts an irresolvable predicament in the 
international arena. On the one hand, residence is a fundamental concept in the field of 
international taxation. On the other hand, the idea of residence is both conceptually and 
practically inapplicable to corporations. It is no wonder that the current international 
corporate tax regime has proven unworkable and that reform proposals—which continue 
to rely upon the concept of corporate residence—fair little better. Of course, this is not to 
say that the corporate tax regime, as currently construed, functions properly even in the 
domestic arena. In the domestic arena, the corporate tax regime contains innumerable 
loopholes (which tax advisors are constantly trying to exploit and Congress is constantly 
trying to close) and traps (which tax advisors are constantly trying to avoid and about 
which Congress appears not too concerned). 124  However, the problems faced by the 
domestic corporate tax regime are not systemic but rather the result of certain flaws that 
have crept into the system. Within the domestic arena, it is, in theory, possible to reform 
the corporate tax regime and transform it into a coherent and consistent structure.125 In 
the international arena, it is simply not possible to design a corporate tax structure that 
achieves coherence and consistency. The problem is not in the details but in the very 
attempt to treat corporations as taxpayers in an arena in which the concept of residence is 
indispensable.  
 
                                                      
121 I.R.C. § 882(b). 
122 I.R.C. § 11(a) (imposing tax “on the taxable income of every corporation”) and § 882(b) 
(qualifying §11(a) and providing that in the case of a foreign corporation, gross income includes only income 
derived from U.S. sources and income effectively connected to a U.S. trade or business). 
123 In certain instances, the Code provides for the taxation of U.S. residents who are shareholders in 
“foreign corporations.” See I.R.C. §§ 951–59 (“Subpart F”). 
124 ELKINS, supra note 120, at v. 
125 See, e.g., id. at 21–25, 309–12 (arguing that a great deal of the complexity and inequity of the 
corporate tax structure could be avoided by bifurcating the price of stock into the amount paid for the right to 
receive pre-acquisition earnings on the one hand and the remaining rights attached to the stock on the other). 
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V. A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAX REGIME 
Because residence is such a crucial element in international taxation and because 
the concept of residence is inapplicable to corporations, the current corporate tax regime 
is unviable in the international arena. Thus, there is no feasible alternative other than to 
abandon the current international corporate tax regime. 
This Part will describe how one might go about designing an international 
corporate tax regime that focuses on shareholders instead of corporations.126 Due to the 
complexity of the subject matter, a detailed proposal for such an international corporate 
tax regime would go far beyond the scope of the current article. What I can do here is 
describe in broad outline the most fundamental issues that such a regime would face and 
suggest how it might go about dealing with those issues.127 
                                                      
126 To a great extent, the analysis in this Part relies upon a 1995 article by Professor Joseph Dodge, 
in which he proposed abandoning the corporate income tax altogether. Dodge, supra note 77. The essence of 
Dodge’s proposal was that when shares are publicly traded, shareholders would be taxed on a mark-to-market 
basis, while closely held corporations would be treated for tax purposes as partnerships. However, Dodge 
freely admitted that applying his proposal in the international arena presents complex design problems. Id. at 
334. He begins by stating, as a matter of fact, that U.S. corporations are subject to tax on their worldwide 
income and that foreign corporations are subject to tax only on their U.S.-source income. Id. at 335. He goes 
on to analyze the tax liability of U.S. individuals who own shares in foreign corporations. Id. at 336–37. He 
considers U.S. corporations with substantial foreign equity ownership, foreign corporations in which U.S. 
equity interest is “quite low,” foreign corporations in which U.S. equity interest is “fairly high” and foreign 
corporations “largely (say, 80%) controlled by U.S. shareholders.” Id. at 338–39, 342–43. For instance, he 
calls for a “flat rate withholding tax directly on the foreign corporation’s net income … where the percentage 
of control by U.S. shareholders is fairly high,” but “a withholding tax on the foreign [corporation’s] U.S. 
income only” when “U.S. equity does not exceed the requisite threshold.” Id. at 339. He goes on to 
distinguish between the described withholding tax on U.S. income and “a ‘straight’ U.S. tax on the foreign … 
corporation’s U.S. income.” Id. at 339. I cannot here undertake a thorough review of Professor Dodge’s 
ambitious proposal and its application in the international arena. However, I would suggest that these 
distinctions, which greatly complicate the analysis, are both unnecessary and normatively unjustifiable. If 
residence is not a proper attribute of corporations, then we do not need to distinguish between U.S. 
corporations and foreign corporations and can focus our attention on resident shareholders and nonresident 
shareholders. Furthermore, the tax treatment of a corporation or its shareholders should not depend upon 
whether U.S. equity ownership crosses a certain threshold. As I explain in the text, infra, the only distinctions 
that we need to make are between corporations with U.S. source income and those without U.S. source 
income and between corporation that provide U.S. authorities with both the relevant information and 
adequate audit opportunities and those that do not. I submit that reducing the number of categories into which 
we need to classify corporations permits a proposal that is more coherent and simpler to implement in 
practice. 
127 Because the tax regime described in the text is a response to challenges faced by the current 
corporate tax regime in the international arena—the fact that residence is a fundamental concept in the field 
of international taxation but conceptually inapplicable to the corporate entity—it is possible to adopt the 
proposed tax regime in the international arena while retaining something akin to the current corporate tax 
regime in the domestic arena. Should policy makers deem it desirable to do so, I would suggest that the 
domestic tax regime be formally elective (“check the box”), without regard to the corporation’s POI, its 
economic ties to the U.S., or the residence of its shareholders. Corporations electing the domestic tax regime 
would be liable to tax on their worldwide income. Following current law, shareholders in such a corporation 
would be subject to further tax at reduced rates on dividends and on capital gain from the sale of shares. Of 
course, they would be exempt from the shareholder-level tax in the proposed international corporate tax 
regime described it the text. 
Already a third of a century ago, Tillinghast suggested the possibility of a check-the-box regime for 
corporate international taxation. See Tillinghast, supra note 1, at 266 (“The logic of this conclusion leads to 
another view so radical that it has not even been whispered for twenty years, that U.S. persons might be given 
the election to treat a U.S. incorporated entity as a foreign one.”). 
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A. Computing the Income of U.S. Shareholders 
The first issue that a shareholder-focused international corporate tax regime 
would need to confront is how to calculate a resident shareholder’s accession to wealth. 
Publicly traded shares present the fewest problems in this regard. The fact that the market 
value of the shares at any given moment can easily be ascertained means that quantifying 
the shareholder’s economic gain (or loss) during the year is a simple mathematical 
exercise.128 Within the framework of a tax regime that refrains from taxing corporations 
and instead imposes tax directly on shareholders,129 mark-to-market reflects the idea that 
a corporation’s accession to wealth is irrelevant from the perspective of the normative 
goals of the tax system. The fact that a corporation may have reported a profit has no 
normative significance if shareholders experience no economic gain. Conversely, the fact 
that there is no reported profit on the corporate level has no normative import if 
shareholders do experience an accession to wealth. Granted, numerous factors ranging 
from well-founded expectations regarding the corporation’s future prospects to 
unsubstantiated swings in market mood may explain why share prices do not track 
corporate income, so that the market price may not reflect true underlying economic 
value. Nevertheless, by definition a shareholder’s accession to wealth is a function of the 
changing market values of the securities that the shareholder owns (along with any 
distributions that the shareholder receives), and it is the individual shareholder’s 
accession to wealth that has normative import from the perspective of income taxation.130 
                                                      
128 Gain (or loss) equals (a) the market value of any shares held at the end of the year plus (b) the 
amount received for any shares sold during the year plus (c) any distributions received during the year minus 
(d) the market value of any shares held at the beginning of the year minus (e) the amount paid for any shares 
purchased during the year. As an example, assume that as of the end of 2016, Terry, a U.S. resident 
individual, owned 500 shares of stock in XYZ Corporation and that the market value of each share of stock as 
of the end of 2016 was $100. On March 13, 2017, Terry purchased an addition 300 shares of XYZ at $120 a 
share. On June 15, 2017, XYZ paid a dividend of $12 a share. On October 8, 2017, Terry sold 200 shares of 
XYZ for $110 a share. At the end of trading on December 31, 2017, XYZ shares were worth $95 each. Using 
the above formula, Terry’s accession to wealth resulting from the investment in XYZ stock would be: (600 X 
$95) + (200 x $110) + (800 x $12) – (500 x $100) – (300 x $120) = $2,600. 
129 Even within the framework of the current corporate tax regime, commentators have suggested 
that marking securities to market is superior to deferring recognition of shareholder-level gain or loss until 
realization. See, e.g., John P. Bransfield, Proposal to Change the Federal Income Taxation of Marketable 
Securities, 2 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 328 (2001–2002); Samuel D. Brunson, Taxing Investors on a Mark-to-
Market Basis, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 507 (2010); Eric D. Chason, Naked and Coved in Monte Carlo: A 
Reappraisal of Option Taxation, 27 VA. TAX REV. 135 (2007); David Elkins, The Myth of Realization: Mark-
to-Market Taxation of Publically-Traded Securities, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 375 (2010); Timothy Hurley, 
“Robbing” the Rich to Give to the Poor: Abolishing Realization and Adopting Mark-to-Market Taxation, 25 
THOMAS M. COOLEY L. REV. 529 (2008); Mark L. Louie, Realizing Appreciation Without Sale: Accrual 
Taxation of Capital Gains on Marketable Securities, 34 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1982); Clarissa Potter, Mark-to-
Market Taxation as the Way to Save the Income Tax – A Former Administrator’s View, 33 VAL. U.L. Rev. 
879 (1999); David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1111 (1986); David Slawson, Taxing as Ordinary Income the Appreciation of Publicly Held Stock, 76 
YALE L. J. 623 (1967); David A, Weisbach, A Partial Mark-to-Market System, 53 N.Y.U. TAX REV. 95 
(1999); But see Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism and the Virtue 
of Attainable Values, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 889–91 (1997). 
130 Ordinarily the law refrains from taxing unrealized gains because of the problems of valuation 
and liquidity. In other words, despite the fact that appreciation in the value of one’s assets constitutes clear 
economic gain, requiring payment of tax would impose significant compliance and enforcement costs. With 
regard to publicly traded securities, these costs are minimal. As noted, the market price of a publicly traded 
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Computing an individual’s gain from shareholding in a closely held corporation 
is more difficult. The absence of a fluid market complicates the task of tracking the 
changing market value of the shares.131 In such a case, the best practical alternative may 
be tentatively to assume that shareholders’ (positive or negative) accession to wealth is 
equal to their proportionate share of the corporation’s profit (or loss) and adopt a flow-
through tax regime. Under current law, a number of legal entities are subject to flow-
through regimes, prominent among them being partnerships,132  S corporations,133  and 
multi-member limited liability companies (LLCs).134 Describing in detail the contours of 
these regimes and the differences between them and analyzing which would be most 
appropriate for corporations in the international arena is beyond the scope of this article. 
However, I can mention in brief the common features of the various flow-through 
regimes. First, the entity itself pays no tax. Second, its stakeholders (partners, 
shareholders, or members, depending on the type of entity involved) report on an annual 
basis their proportionate share of the entity’s gain or loss. Third, when the stakeholders 
sell their rights in the entity, they report gain or loss reflecting the difference between 
their total economic gain or loss and the sum of the gains or losses periodically reported. 
One practical problem that could arise in this regard is that the corporation might 
not prepare financial statements at all, might not calculate its income in accordance with 
U.S. tax principles, or might not permit U.S. tax authorities to audit its books. This 
problem is most likely to arise when the United States does not have jurisdiction over the 
corporation and the U.S. shareholder is not in a position to impel the corporation to 
comply with the demands of U.S. tax law. In such a case, it would be reasonable to adopt 
the tax regime applicable under current law to U.S. persons who own shares in “passive 
foreign investment companies” (PFICs). Under the provisions of I.R.C. § 1291 (which 
apply to U.S. shareholders who did not make an election to be taxed on their 
proportionate share of the PFIC’s income or to be taxed on a mark-to-market basis), tax is 
deferred until the sale or exchange of the stock, but the shareholder must pay interest to 
compensate the government for the deferral.135 Under the proposed regime, deferral with 
the accompanying interest charge would not depend upon the percentage interest of U.S. 
shareholders (and certainly would not depend on the “residence” of the corporation). It 
                                                                                                                                                   
share is easily ascertainable. The fact that the shareholder can sell any amount of shares with very low 
transaction costs solves the problem of liquidity. In other words, the taxpayer can at any given moment 
compute gain, determine how much of that gain belongs to the government, and can extract an amount 
necessary to satisfy the government’s claim. See the sources cited supra note 129. 
131 Furthermore, the absence of a fluid market creates problems of liquidity—the shareholder may 
have experienced an accession to wealth but not have cash available to pay the tax. Because of the lack of a 
ready market and because of the possible effect on the shareholder’s control of the corporation, selling shares 
in a closely held corporation is fundamentally different from selling shares in a widely-held, publicly traded 
corporation. 
132 I.R.C. §§ 701–77 (“Subpart K”). 
133 I.R.C. §§ 1361–78. 
134 Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701–3(a), (b)(1)(i) (1997). 
135 The gain is considered as having accrued pro rata over the period the stock was held, the gain 
allocated to each year is taxed at the highest statutory rate for that year, and the tax due then accrues interest 
from the end of the that year. For example, assume that the stock was purchased at the beginning of Year 1 
for $100,000 and was sold at the end of Year 10 for $300,000, that the highest statutory tax rate each year 
was 40% and the applicable interest is 5% a year. Under I.R.C. § 1291, Year 1 gain would be $20,000, Year 1 
tax would be $8,000, and the amount due including interest would be $8,000 x 1.059 = $12,411. Year 2 gain 
would be $20,000, Year 2 tax would be $8,000 the amount due including interest would be $8,000 x 1.058 = 
$11,820, and so forth. The tax due, including interest, for the entire gain would be $100,624. 
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would apply to all U.S. shareholders of any corporation that, in fact, did not keep or did 
not produce the appropriate books.136 
 
B. Taxing Nonresident Shareholders 
The second issue that the proposed international corporate tax regime would need 
to confront is the treatment of nonresident shareholders. Under current international 
norms, countries have the right to impose tax on nonresidents who earn domestic-source 
income.137 However, attempting to enforce a direct tax on nonresident shareholders for 
their proportional share of a corporation’s domestic-source income would likely prove 
difficult in practice. Consequently, taxing nonresidents on their domestic source income 
probably requires the imposition of a territorial tax at the corporate level. In this context, 
it is important to reiterate that the proposal does not categorize corporations as 
“domestic” or “foreign.”138 The only relevant distinction among corporations is that some 
have U.S.-source income and some do not. No corporation would be subject to U.S. tax 
on its foreign-source income.139 All corporations would, in principle, be subject to U.S. 
tax on their U.S.-source income.140 The sole intended “targets” of the corporate-level tax 
would be nonresident shareholders. Shareholders who are U.S. residents would be subject 
to direct tax via one of the methods already described: mark-to-market, flow-through, or 
realization plus interest.141 
Following this line of reasoning, the corporate tax rate would be the rate 
applicable to nonresident individuals who derive U.S. source income.142 As an example, 
under current law nonresidents are exempt from tax on U.S. source portfolio interest.143 
If, due to the pressures of international tax competition, this policy continues, 
                                                      
136 As the deferral with interest regime is often onerous, it is reasonable to expect that U.S. 
shareholders would tend to prefer corporations that commit to maintain and produce such books. See, e.g., 
RICHARD L. DOERNBERG, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 380 (2009) (“This method can be quite punitive.”). 
Corporations that wish to attract U.S. investors might therefore voluntary comply with the requirements of 
U.S. tax even though they may be under no legal requirement to do so. 
137 See sources cited supra note 118. 
138 Cf. Graetz, supra note 2, at 321: “[T]he thrust of these efforts is to impose residence-based 
taxation whenever the foreign corporation is substantially owned or controlled by U.S. persons (including 
other corporations).” In other words, when a “U.S. corporation” owns a “foreign corporation,” the goal of 
residence-based taxation requires the current taxation of the income earned by the latter. However, it is far 
from clear why the residence of the “U.S. corporation” is any less artificial than the residence of the “foreign 
corporation.” If the concept of residence is applicable to corporations, then the income of the “foreign 
corporation” is the income of a foreign resident and should not be subject to U.S. taxation. If the concept of 
residence is not applicable to corporations, then the fact that at the apex of the corporate structure is a “U.S. 
corporation” is of no normative import. 
139 But see the description of a possible domestic corporate tax regime that could operate parallel 
the proposed international tax regime, supra note 125. 
140 Some corporations might be exempt from the tax. See the text, infra, surrounding note 154–56. 
141 See supra Subpart A. Subpart C, infra, considers how to prevent double taxation of U.S. 
residents who own shares in corporations with domestic-source income. 
142 I have elsewhere argued that income is an inappropriate tax base for nonresidents in general and 
for multinational enterprises in particular. Elkins, supra note 84. The text assumes that the United States 
continues its current policy of taxing nonresidents on their domestic source income. Should the United States 
abandon that policy and adopt a base other than income for taxing nonresidents, the same tax regime would 
also apply to corporations. 
143 I.R.C. §§ 871(h), 881(c). 
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corporations should similarly be exempt from tax on their portfolio interest.144 Such an 
exemption would substantively affect only nonresident shareholders, as resident 
shareholders would be subject to tax directly, via the previously described mark-to-
market, flow-through, or deferral-plus-interest regime.  As another example, under 
current law nonresidents who earn “fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, 
profits, and income” (“FDAP income”) are subject to a 30% tax on gross income.145 As 
long as this policy continues to apply to nonresident individuals, then under the proposal 
anyone paying FDAP income to a corporation would need to withhold tax at the rate of 
30%.146 
If a corporation receiving U.S. source income is a resident of another country in 
accordance with that country’s tax law (I am considering here the possibility that other 
countries may retain the concept of corporate residence), the corporation might be in a 
position to claim benefits under a tax treaty between the United States and its country of 
residence. Ostensibly, treaty protection presents a problem for the proposed international 
tax regime: shareholders might be residents either of countries that do not have tax 
treaties with the United States or of countries the terms of whose treaties with the United 
States are less generous than those of the treaty between the United States and the 
corporation’s country of residence. For example, assume that the domestic laws of 
Country A classify Corporation X as a Country A resident and that the tax treaty between 
the United States and Country A prohibits either country from imposing tax on royalties 
received by residents of the other country.147 Assume also that Individual Y owns shares 
in Corporation X and that Individual Y is a resident of a country that does not have a tax 
treaty with the United States. Were Individual Y to receive U.S.-source royalties directly, 
the royalty would be subject to U.S. tax at the rate of 30%. 148  However, because 
Individual Y indirectly receives the royalty via Corporation X, the royalty will escape 
U.S. taxation. 
Tax treaties to which the United States is a signatory deal with this issue, known 
as “treaty shopping,” by means of a Limitation of Benefits provision (LOB).149 While the 
details of LOB are intricate and vary from treaty to treaty, the underlying idea is that a 
corporation resident in one of the countries may not claim benefits under the treaty unless 
at least 50% of its shares are beneficially owned by individuals resident in that country or 
its shares are publicly traded on an exchange located in that country.150 LOB is an anti-
abuse measure designed to prevent individuals from establishing a corporation in a 
country, other than that of which they themselves are residents, in order to benefit from 
                                                      
144 See, e.g., Elkins, supra note 65, at 912; Ming-Sung Kuo, (Dis)embodiments of Constitutional 
Authorship: Global Tax Competition and the Crisis of Constitutional Democracy, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. 
REV. 181, 187 (2009), Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 25, at 1581–83; Yoram Keinan, The Case for 
Residency-Based Taxation of Financial Transactions in Developing Countries, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 29 (2008). 
145 I.R.C. §§ 871(a), 881(a). 
146 For the current withholding requirement, see I.R.C. §§ 1441, 1442. Under the proposal, the 
withholding requirement under I.R.C. § 1442 would apply not to “foreign corporations,” but to all 
corporations (except for those subject to a possible parallel domestic tax regime as described in note 126, 
supra, and those exempt from corporate-level as described in the text surrounding notes 154–56, infra). 
147 See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Art. 13(1), Neth.-U.S., Dec. 18, 1992, 2291 U.N.T.S. 40832. 
148 I.R.C. § 871(h). 
149 See UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION, supra note 79, at art. 22. 
150 Id., at art. 22(2)(d). 
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the provisions of the tax treaty between the United States and the corporation’s country of 
residence.151 
It might seem that for a tax regime that purports to reject the concept of corporate 
residence, LOB as currently constituted is insufficient. When a corporation qualifies 
under LOB, those shareholders who are not resident in the corporation’s country of 
residence benefit from the provisions of the treaty even though they would not so benefit 
were they to have received the income directly. However, I would submit that this 
problem is less acute than it might appear at first glance. The distinction between 
residents of two foreign countries is substantively different from the distinction between 
foreign residents and domestic residents. With regard to the distinction between domestic 
and foreign residents, there is a normative policy goal to tax the former on their 
worldwide income and to tax the latter only on their domestic-source income. Taxing 
nonresidents on their foreign-source income or permitting residents to escape tax on their 
foreign-source income is inconsistent with that policy. With regard to residents of foreign 
countries, treaty provisions derive not from normative, but from practical considerations: 
each side agrees to limit its right to tax certain types of income in return for a similar 
commitment from the other signatory. When another country demands that corporations 
that it classifies as domestic residents receive benefits under the treaty, the United States 
has to consider whether the overall advantages of the treaty are worth the cost of agreeing 
to such a provision. Current U.S. policy is to reject such a demand unless the corporation 
meets the LOB criteria.152 Of course, by way of reciprocity, the United States is willing to 
agree to impose a similar condition on U.S. corporations seeking treaty benefits. 
Under the proposed tax regime, the United States would no longer classify 
corporations as either domestic or foreign. This would mean that no treaty to which the 
United States is currently a signatory would protect any corporation, even one wholly 
owned by U.S. resident individuals, from the taxing authority of the other country. 
Therefore, the abandonment of the notion of corporate residence would require a 
renegotiation of the United States’ treaty network. As a condition of agreeing to allow 
corporations resident in the other country to benefit from the provisions of the treaty, the 
United States should demand protection for U.S. resident individuals who are 
shareholders of corporations that derive income from sources in the other country. 
A comprehensive discussion of how to accommodate the U.S. treaty network to 
the proposed tax regime is beyond the scope of this Article. However, I will briefly 
mention two possible modifications that might be appropriate. One would be an 
expansion of the term “resident” to include not only a corporation that “is liable to tax 
therein by reason of … place of management, place of incorporation, or any other 
criterion of a similar nature,”153 but also a corporation a certain percentage of whose 
shareholders are liable to tax therein by virtue of residence. In other words, a corporation, 
                                                      
151 See, e.g., id. at art. 22(6) (“If a resident of a Contracting State is [not] a qualified person … the 
competent authority of the other Contracting State may, nevertheless, grant the benefits of this Convention … 
if such resident demonstrates to the satisfaction of such competent authority a substantial nontax nexus to its 
Contracting State of residence and that neither its establishment, acquisition or maintenance, nor the conduct 
of its operations had as one of its principal purposes the obtaining of benefits under this Convention.”). 
152 Prior to 1977, the United States did not include LOB in the treaties that it signed. During the 
1980s and 1990s, the U.S. renegotiated its treaty network, and today all treaties to which the United States is 
a signatory contain LOB. See generally JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 280–81 (2005). 
153 See UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION, supra note 79, at art. 4(1). 
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although not a “resident” under U.S. domestic law, might nevertheless be a “U.S. 
resident” for purposes of the treaty. Such a provision would effectively constitute a 
mirror image of LOB. The idea would be that a corporation with a sufficiently large 
percentage of shareholders who are U.S. residents would be treated for purposes of the 
treaty as if it itself were a U.S. resident. This problem with such a provision is that, like 
any provision that assigns residence to corporations, it is both under-inclusive and over-
inclusive.154  It is under-inclusive because it does not protect U.S. residents who are 
shareholders in corporations whose U.S. ownership does not reach the threshold. It is 
over-inclusive because it effectively protects non-U.S. residents who are shareholders in 
corporations whose U.S. ownership does reach the threshold. 155  Another possibility 
would be to permit the other country to tax corporations as it sees fit, but to require it to 
refund a proportionate share of the tax to any shareholder of the corporation who is a U.S. 
resident. Such a provision is more thematic in the sense that it targets all U.S. 
shareholders and only U.S. shareholders. The disadvantage of such a provision is that it 
might be more complicated to implement. 
As noted, the purpose of the corporate income tax as described in this Subpart 
would be to serve as an indirect tax on nonresident shareholders. Therefore, I would 
propose an exemption from the corporate-level tax in two cases. First, a corporation 
should be exempt from tax if proves that all of its shareholders are U.S. residents. 
Second, a corporation some or all of whose shareholder are nonresidents would be 
exempt from tax if it proves that all of its nonresident shareholders filed U.S. tax returns 
in which they reported and paid tax on their share of the corporation’s U.S. source 
income.156 In other words, in those instances in which the corporation’s shareholders pay 
tax directly on the corporation’s domestic source income, the corporate-level tax would 
be superfluous.157 These exemptions, in addition to being conceptually thematic, would 
simplify the structure by preventing at the outset the double taxation of residents who 
own shares in corporations with domestic-source income and obviating the need for a 
subsequent mitigation of the double tax.158 
 
C. Avoiding Double Taxation 
The third issue that the proposed international tax regime would need to consider 
is how to account for taxes paid at the corporate level when computing the tax liability of 
resident shareholders. For the purpose of our discussion, I will assume that the United 
States wishes to continue its current policy of taxing nonresidents on their U.S.-source 
income, that other countries routinely impose tax on income derived from sources within 
                                                      
154 See supra Part IV. 
155 Ostensibly, such overprotection is not of real concern to the United States. However, insisting 
upon such overprotection (implicit in the demand that a corporation with a certain level of U.S. ownership is 
entitled to treaty benefits) would increase the cost of the treaty to the other signatory, which might demand 
additional U.S. concessions as a quid pro quo. 
156 This Article does not consider the procedure by which a corporate would demonstrate either that 
all of its shareholders were U.S. residents or that all of its nonresident shareholders filed the necessary returns 
and paid the applicable tax. Nor does it consider under what circumstances it might be appropriate to impose 
reporting or withholding obligations on the corporation to guarantee payment of tax by the shareholders. 
157 These exemptions, in addition to being conceptually thematic, would simplify the structure by 
preventing at the outset the double taxation of residents who own shares in corporations with domestic-source 
income and obviating the need for a subsequent mitigation of the double tax, as described in Subpart C, infra. 
158 See Subpart C, infra. 
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their territory, and that the United States wishes to continue its policy of mitigating 
double taxation by permitting a credit for foreign income taxes paid by U.S. residents.159 
Each of these policies is controversial, and it is far from certain that an ideal international 
tax regime would retain all or even any of them.160 However, to keep the discussion 
manageable and to demonstrate how the proposed international corporate tax regime 
might operate under the most plausible set of assumptions regarding international tax 
policy that one can make at this time, I will assume that the aforementioned policies will 
continue. 
The imposition of a corporate-level territorial tax as a means of indirectly taxing 
nonresident shareholders complicates the taxation of U.S. shareholders. As we have seen, 
U.S. residents will pay tax on the income derived from their shareholding (computed 
mark-to-market, on a flow-through basis, or at realization with an interest charge). When 
the corporation has U.S.-source income, the corporate-level tax would mean that the 
same income would be subject to double U.S. taxation. Furthermore, if the corporation 
has foreign-source income subject to foreign income taxes, that income would also be 
subject both to foreign tax (at the corporate level) and to U.S. tax (at the shareholder 
level).161 
Consequently, U.S. shareholders should be entitled to a credit equal to their 
proportionate share of the income tax, whether U.S. or foreign, incurred by the 
corporation.162 From the perspective of shareholders who are U.S. residents, this would 
effectively eliminate the corporate-level tax and leave only the shareholder-level tax. As 
the credit is indirect (a shareholder-level credit for a corporate-level tax) and is available 
for both U.S. and foreign corporate-level income taxes, I will refer to it as an Indirect Tax 
Credit or ITC. 
On a technical note, whenever the shareholder’s income is a function of a 
shareholder-level event (e.g., change in value of the shareholder’s shares, receipt of a 
dividend, or sale of shares), the amount of the ITC would need to be considered 
additional income in the hands of the shareholder. The reason is that because the 
corporate-level tax presumably reduces the value of the shares, the taxpayer receives an 
implicit deduction for tax paid by the corporation. A credit in addition to the deduction 
                                                      
159 I.R.C. § 901. 
160 With regard to the taxing the domestic source income of nonresidents, see note 140, supra. With 
regard to the foreign tax credit, it is arguable that foreign income taxes are properly viewed as an expense of 
operating in foreign countries and thus do not create a problem of double taxation. See, e.g., SHAVIRO, 
FIXING, supra note 25, at 68; Daniel Shaviro, The Case Against Foreign Tax Credits, 3 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 
65 (2011). See also ISENBERGH, supra note 152, at 134 (“The only allowance for foreign income taxes in the 
1913 Income Tax Law was a deduction for taxes paid to foreign governments as a cost of doing business.”). 
Nevertheless, as noted by Shaviro, “[p]erhaps no feature of modern income tax systems has gained such 
consistent … approval from commentators as the foreign tax credit.” Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Foreign 
Tax Creditability, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 709, 709 (2010). 
161 As noted, this Subpart will proceed from the assumption that U.S. tax policy continues to view 
the imposition of tax both by the source country and by the country of residence as an inappropriate double 
tax. 
162 As tax liability is ordinarily computed on an annual basis, I would suggest that shareholders who 
acquired or disposed of shares during the course of a year be entitled to a proportionate share of the credit to 
which they would otherwise be entitled. For example, assume that a U.S. resident purchases 20% of the 
shares on April 1 and an additional 15% of the shares on September 1 and that the corporation incurred 
income tax liability (both U.S. and foreign) of $500,000. The shareholder’s foreign tax credit would equal 
$500,000 x [(20% x 9/12) + (15% x 4/12)] = $100,000. 
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would overcompensate the shareholder for the corporate-level tax. 163  To avoid 
overcompensation, we need to eliminate the deduction before granting the credit. The 
same issue arises under current law when a domestic corporation claims a credit for 
foreign taxes paid by another corporation in which it owns stock and from which it 
receives a taxable dividend.164 I.R.C. § 78 provides that in such a case, an amount equal 
to the claimed credit will constitute income in the hands of the domestic corporation. 
Although the framework within which § 78 operates is different from that of this 
Article’s proposal, the method adopted by § 78 is the simplest way to “gross up” the 
income.165 Therefore, I would propose that, whenever a shareholder’s taxable income is 
the function of a shareholder-level event, the ITC constitute income in hands of the 
individual claiming the credit.166 
To demonstrate, assume that Pat, a U.S. resident subject to a tax rate of 40%, 
owns 100,000 out of ABC Corp’s 10,000,000 outstanding shares. During the year in 
question, the market price of ABC shares rose from $50 a share to $58 a share, and ABC 
paid income tax, both U.S. and foreign, of $15,000,000. The computation of Pat’s U.S. 
tax liability would be as follows: 
(1) Pat’s shares increased in value by $800,000.167 
(2) As the owner of 1% of the shares in ABC, Pat would be entitled to an 
ITC of $150,000.168 
(3) Pat’s taxable income attributable to holding shares in ABC would be 
$950,000.169 
(4) Pat’s initial U.S. tax liability, before the ITC, would be $380,000.170 
                                                      
163 For example, assume that Sally is a resident individual who owns shares in a publicly traded 
corporation, that her shares appreciated by $1,000, that her proportionate share of income taxes paid by the 
corporation is $250, and that she is subject to tax at the rate of 40%. Were we to compute her tax liability by 
multiplying $1,000 by 40% and then subtracting $250, we would end up with a figure of $150. This would 
constitute overcompensation for the corporate-level taxes. Presumably, the value of the shares reflects those 
corporate-level taxes. In other words, without the corporate-level tax, Sally’s shares would have appreciated 
not by $1,000 but by $1,250. At a 40% tax rate, Sally would have paid tax of $500. With the corporate level-
tax and the overly generous credit, she will bear a total tax burden, both direct and indirect, of only $400 (her 
share of the corporate-level tax is $250 and her direct tax liability is $150). In others words, instead of after-
tax income of $750 ($1,250 – $500), Sally will end up with after-tax income of $850 ($1,000 – $150). 
164 I.R.C. §§ 902(a), 960(a)(1). 
165 I.R.C. § 78 refers to a domestic corporation claiming an indirect credit for foreign taxes paid 
by a corporation from which it receives a dividend. The proposal presented here refers to a resident 
individual claiming an indirect credit for either foreign taxes or domestic taxes paid by any corporation 
in which the individual owns shares. 
166 The adjustment described in this paragraph is not necessary in the case of a privately held 
corporation when the shareholder reports her proportionate share of the corporation’s tax income. The reason 
for this is that because income tax is not a deductible expense, taxable income represents the corporation’s 
income before payment of tax. For example, assume that Sally’s share of the corporation’s taxable income is 
$1,250 that her proportionate share of the corporate-level tax is $250. As the figure of $1,250 is her 
proportionate share of the corporation’s income before payment of the corporate-level tax, it would not be 
appropriate to add the latter to the former in determining her income. In other words, to compute her tax 
liability we would multiply $1,250 by 40% and subtract $250 and end up with a figure of $250. She will thus 
bear a total tax burden, both direct and indirect, of $500 (her share of the corporate-level tax is $250 and her 
direct tax liability is also $250), which is equivalent to the tax burden that she would have born in the absence 
of the corporate-level tax. 
167 100,000 x ($58 – $50) = $800,000. 
168 $15,000,000 x (100,000/10,000,000) = $150,000. 
169 $800,000 + $150,000 = $950,000. 
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(5) Following the ITC, Pat would pay U.S. tax of $230,000.171 
However, the algorithm may have to be a little more complicated, because the 
simple computation just described did not consider the geographical source of earnings, 
nor did it take into consideration the jurisdiction to which the corporation paid tax. Under 
current U.S. tax policy there is an important distinction between U.S.-source income and 
foreign-source income and between U.S. income tax and foreign income tax. Foreign 
income taxes are creditable only to the extent of the taxpayer’s U.S. tax liability on 
foreign-source income. 172  The idea behind this provision is that foreign income tax 
should not be able to reduce U.S. income tax liability on U.S.-source income. This 
limitation of the Foreign Tax Credit (FTC) is not free from controversy.173 Nonetheless, 
as with other aspects of current U.S. international tax policy, I will assume that this 
policy continues to hold and will attempt to show how the proposed international 
corporate tax regime might accommodate it. 
I would suggest that to accommodate the limitations on the crediting of foreign 
income taxes, corporations would, as they do under current law, track and report on an 
annual basis their U.S.-source income, their foreign-source income, their U.S. income tax 
liability, and their foreign income tax liability. Shareholders’ income would be allocated 
to U.S. sources and to foreign sources in accordance with the corporation’s ratio of U.S.-
source income to foreign-source income. ITC from payment of foreign income tax would 
be treated as an FTC and subject all of the limitation applicable thereto, while ITC from 
payment of U.S. income would be creditable without restriction. 
Returning to our example, assume that ABC Corp. reported $30,000,000 of 
foreign-source income, $120,000,000 of U.S.-source income, $10,000,000 of foreign 
income tax, and $5,000,000 of U.S. income tax.174 The computation would be as follows: 
(1) Of Pat’s $950,000 in income, 175  $190,000 would be foreign-source 
income,176 and $760,000 would be U.S.-source income.177 
(2) Pat’s initial U.S. tax liability, before the ITC, on the foreign-source 
income would be $76,000.178 Her initial U.S. tax liability, before the ITC, on the U.S.-
source income would be $304,000.179 
                                                                                                                                                   
170 $950,000 x 40% = $380,000. 
171 $380,000 – $150,000 = $230,000. 
172 I.R.C. § 904. 
173 David Hasen, Tax Neutrality and Tax Amenities, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 57, 64–65, 72 (2012); Paul 
R. McDaniel, The U.S. Tax Treatment of Foreign Source Income Earned in Developing Countries: A Policy 
Analysis, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 265, 268–69 (2003); Charles E. McLure Jr., Legislative, Judicial, Soft 
Law, Cooperate Approaches to Harmonizing Corporate Income, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 377, 387 n.32 (2008). 
174 In the example, the U.S. corporate tax rate on U.S. source income is extremely low ($5 
million/$120 million = 4.17%). The reason that I chose these figures is to demonstrate what happens when 
the ITC for U.S. income tax is insufficient to eliminate U.S. tax liability on U.S. source income. However, the 
low rate of tax is not unrealistic. For example, under current U.S. law, nonresidents are exempt from tax on 
portfolio interest. Assuming that this policy continues, the exclusion would apply not only to foreign 
individuals but also to corporations. See the text accompanying notes 140–44, supra. 
175 See note 169, supra. 
176 $950,000 x ($30,000,000/$150,000,000) = $190,000. 
177 $950,000 x ($120,000,000/$150,000,000) = $760,000. 
178 $190,000 x 40% = $76,000. 
179 $760,000 x 40% = $304,000. 
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(3) Of Pat’s $150,000 of ITC, $100,000 would be subject to the limitations 
of the FTC,180 and $50,000 will be creditable without restriction.181 
(4) Pat would not need to pay any tax on the foreign source income because 
the ITC subject to the limits of the FTC ($100,000) is greater than the initial U.S. tax 
liability on foreign-source income ($76,000). Pat may use the remaining $24,000 to 
reduce U.S. tax liability on other foreign-source income in accordance to the relevant 
provisions of the Code. 
(5)  Regarding income attributable to U.S. sources, Pat would pay tax of 
$254,000, derived from an initial tax liability of $304,000 and an ITC of $50,000.182 
From a practical perspective, the United States does not have the jurisdiction to 
compel all corporations to track and report U.S.-source income, foreign-source income, 
U.S. income tax incurred, and foreign income tax incurred; nor does it have the 
jurisdiction to compel all corporations to submit to an audit by U.S. administrators to 
verify the numbers that it does report. Consequently, I would propose that when the 
corporation does not produce such a report or does not provide U.S. tax authorities an 
opportunity to conduct a satisfactory audit, all income would be deemed U.S.-source. 
Stated in other terms, shareholders would bear the burden of refuting a presumption that 
the corporation’s income is all U.S. source. With regard to the ITC, granting the credit 
would in any case depend upon the corporation providing sufficient proof of such 
payment to U.S. tax authorities, who could then determine how much of the ITC is 
traceable to the payment of foreign income tax and how much is traceable to the payment 
of U.S. income tax. In the absence of such proof, shareholders would not be entitled to an 
ITC. 
The purpose of these procedural provisions would be twofold. First, by creating a 
rebuttable presumption that all income is U.S.-source and that that the corporation paid 
no income tax, they would protect U.S. international tax policy goals by preventing the 
crediting of corporate-level income tax that was not in fact paid and by preventing the 
crediting of foreign income taxes against U.S.-source income. Second, by assuming what 
is from the perspective of shareholders a worst-case scenario, they would create an 
incentive for corporations that wish to attract U.S. investment to provide the 
documentation shareholders would need to rebut the statutory presumptions. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Corporate personhood is a legal fiction, useful in some contexts, less so in others. 
Corporate residence is not a legal fiction. It is an oxymoron. It is an attempt to assign to 
corporations an attribute that contradicts their fundamental nature. The inapplicability of 
residence to corporation is not because corporations cannot “reside” in a place in the 
manner of human beings. This is a semantic, not a substantive issue. Rather, the reason 
that corporate cannot be residents for purposes of income tax is that residence delineates 
the boundaries of taxation in accordance with ability-to-pay, and ability-to-pay is a 
concept that is inapplicable to the corporate entity. 
                                                      
180 $10,000,000 x 1% = $100,000. 
181 $5,000,000 x 1% = $50,000. 
182 Pat cannot use the unused ITC of $24,000 here, as this is U.S.-source income and the $24,000 is 
creditable only against U.S. tax liability from foreign-source income. 
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First, taxation in accordance with ability-to-pay is an attempt to implement 
certain norms of distributive justice. Distributive justice, in turn, concerns the distribution 
of resources among those who have personal identity, who are Kantian rational beings, 
and for whom welfare is a pertinent term. As none of these attributes applies to the 
corporate entity, a corporation cannot conceptually be party to a scheme of distributive 
justice. In other words, the moral value of a redistribution of resources from one 
corporation to another, from a corporation to an individual, or from an individual to a 
corporation cannot be determined except by reference to the effect of such redistribution 
on the welfare of individuals. 
Second, the principles of distributive justice as embodied in the concept of 
ability-to-pay are not universal in scope but apply exclusively to members of the relevant 
society. For this reason, only residents pay tax on their worldwide income. Membership 
in a society is a function of one’s personal connections. A country with which one has 
purely economic connections may have a claim under benefit theory to tax the income 
deriving from those ties. It does not have a claim to tax the income derived from foreign 
sources. As a corporation cannot have personal ties, the idea of corporate residence is a 
misnomer. 
Why, then, are corporations subject to income taxation at all? The most 
persuasive justification for the corporate income tax is that it is an administratively 
convenient indirect tax on individual shareholders. This would seem to imply that we 
could assign residence to corporations by looking to the residence of their shareholders. 
However, such a model cannot succeed. With regard to any corporation with both 
domestic and foreign shareholders, we would face an irresolvable dilemma: classifying it 
as a resident, and consequently liable to tax on its foreign-source income, would 
unjustifiably overtax its foreign shareholders; classifying it as a nonresident, and 
consequently not subject to tax on its foreign-source income, would unjustifiably 
undertax its domestic shareholders. 
Because residence is such a fundamental concept in international taxation, the 
incongruity of corporate residence irrevocably undermines the current international 
corporate tax regime. Therefore, there is no realistic alternative other than imposing tax 
directly on resident shareholders, retaining a territorial corporate income tax as a means 
of taxing foreign individuals who indirectly derive income from domestic sources, and 
adopting appropriate measures on the shareholder level to avoid double taxation of 
resident shareholders. 
The current international corporate tax regime has proven unworkable in 
practice. To a great extent, the seemingly insurmountable challenges encountered by the 
current regime—such as expatriation and the exploitation of foreign subsidiaries—are 
simply practical manifestations of a flaw in the underlying theoretical framework. 
Abandoning the concept of corporate residence is the most thematic and most effective 
way to reform the international corporate tax regime.  
